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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 19, 2016, the international community marked the first
International Day for the Elimination of Sexual Violence in Conflict.
This day aims to raise awareness of the devastating reality of this
violence, to stand in solidarity with the victims and to acknowledge
those working to address this violence. The date was chosen to
commemorate the June 19, 2008 adoption of United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1820, a landmark resolution in which the
Security Council stressed that sexual violence could significantly
exacerbate conflicts and impede peace processes. 1 Most importantly,
this resolution called for prosecutions of those responsible for such
acts and highlighted the need to end impunity “as part of a
comprehensive approach to seeking sustainable peace, justice, truth,
and national reconciliation.” 2
Criminal prosecutions provide an important measure of redress for
victims of mass atrocities. 3 They also fulfill a broader purpose: to
help build and restore peace and the rule of law. Prosecutions are
necessary to demonstrate the intolerance for violations of human
rights in peacetime. This is particularly important in the case of
sexual violence. Impunity for sexual violence reverberates in homes
and on the streets, and contributes to these crimes being viewed as
less serious. 4 When sexual violence is not addressed, it is

1. See S.C. Res. 1820, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1820 (June 19, 2008).
2. Id. ¶ 4.
3. Serge Brammertz & Michelle Jarvis, Lessons Learned in Prosecuting
Gender Crimes under International Law: Experiences from the ICTY, in
PROTECTING HUMANITY: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY IN HONOUR
OF NAVANETHEM PILLAY 95, 113 (Chile Eboe-Osuji ed., 2010).
4. JELKE BOESTEN, SEXUAL VIOLENCE DURING WAR AND PEACE: GENDER,
POWER AND POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE IN PERU 99 (2014); see Romi Sigsworth &
Nahla Valji, Continuities of Violence against Women and the Limitations of
Transitional Justice: The Case of South Africa, in GENDER IN TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE 115, 119-20 (Susanne Buckley-Zistel & Ruth Stanley eds., 2012) (noting
that “how a post-conflict society deals with sexual violence, in particular rape and
rape victims, directly affects the gender regimes (re)established in peacetime”, and
arguing that it is necessary to recognize the continuities of violence during and
after conflict when developing mechanisms of redress in post-conflict contexts.).
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‘normalized’ in post-conflict contexts, often resulting in increased
levels of violence against women. 5 Accountability for these crimes is
therefore critical to building a more just society and to redirecting the
shame and stigma suffered by victims towards the perpetrators. 6
This paper examines the progress made in establishing
accountability for sexual violence committed in the internal conflicts
of Peru, Guatemala, and Colombia. The common ways in which
sexual violence occurred and has been responded to in the three
countries provide useful lessons for domestic practitioners in other
jurisdictions. These countries share common social and cultural
factors influencing the prevalence of sexual and gender-based
violence, specifically against women and girls. In particular, the
intersecting inequalities of gender, race and class played a key role in
rendering certain communities particularly vulnerable to this

5. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General on the
implementation of Security Council resolutions 1820 (2008) and 1888 (2009), ¶14,
U.N. Doc. A/65/592-S/2010/604 (Nov. 24, 2010) (reporting “[i]n Haiti, the use of
rape as a tool of intimidation by the de facto military regime (1991- 2004)
reportedly “normalized” a cycle of violence against women that has been
replicated by criminal elements.”); Progress of the World’s Women: In Pursuit of
Justice, U.N. WOMEN 84 (2011), http://www2.unwomen.org/~/media/
headquarters/attachments/sections/library/publications/2011/progressoftheworldsw
omen-2011-en.pdf?v=1&d=20150402T222835 (indicating that “as demobilized
combatants return home, post-conflict contexts are often characterized by ongoing
and sometimes increased levels of violence and insecurity for women”); Care and
Protection of Children in Crisis Affected Countries: A Good Practice Policy
Change Initiative, CPC NETWORK, 20 (2008), http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_
docs/Pnado992.pdf (documenting the high rates of gender-based violence in
Liberia four years after the end of the conflict); “Now, the World is without Me”:
An Investigation of Sexual Violence in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo,
OXFAM, 2, 19, 39-40 (Apr. 2010), http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/DRC-sexualviolence-2010-04.pdf [hereinafter “Now, the World is without Me”] (analyzing a
17-fold increase in civilian rapes in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo
between 2004 and 2008 and a significant decrease in rapes by combatants, and
arguing that these rates show a reversal in society’s norms and values due to
ongoing impunity).
6. See Gabriela Mischkowski, Address at The Bangladesh Genocide and the
Issue of Justice International Conference, Heidelberg, The Trouble with Rape
Trials – The Prosecution of Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict from the
Perspectives of Female Witnesses (July 4-5, 2013) (arguing that “to prosecute the
wrongdoers means to affirm that wrong was indeed done. It means to show
solidarity with the victims and to revoke solidarity from those who committed the
crimes.”).
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violence in conflict. 7 These factors have also contributed to the
persistent lack of attention these crimes have received from justice
authorities in the post-conflict periods. Although conflict-related
sexual violence has historically rarely been prosecuted, and impunity
remains high, legal practitioners have begun to use international law
to establish accountability for sexual violence in each country. The
different legal and evidentiary approaches applied in sexual violence
cases have been informed by the practice and jurisprudence of
international and regional human rights and criminal courts. Finally,
in all three countries, women’s and victims groups have played a key
role in calling on authorities to ensure justice, truth and reparation for
victims. Victims have participated and exercised their rights both as
witnesses and as civil parties in trial proceedings.
This paper has two parts. Part I explains the context in which
sexual violence occurred in each conflict. It discusses the prevalence
of sexual violence, its diverse manifestations, the categories of
victims, and the perpetrators. It also discusses how authorities in
each country have documented and responded to sexual violence.
Part II focuses on how international law is being used to prosecute
conflict-related sexual violence in each country. It examines the
existing legal frameworks and analyzes how these frameworks are
being applied to charge and prove sexual violence crimes, and to
establish criminal liability. The paper concludes with reflections on
how the experiences of Guatemala, Peru and Colombia can be used
by other national systems seeking to establish accountability for
these crimes.

II. SURFACING GENDERED NARRATIVES OF
VIOLENCE
To move forward as a society, it is important to acknowledge past
violations. 8 How a society narrates and commemorates its past will
influence its path towards a peaceful future. 9 When reflecting on the
7. See discussion infra Part I.
8. See Katherine M. Franke, Gendered Subjects of Transitional Justice, 15
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 813, 823 (2006) (observing that “among the greatest
challenges of transitional justice [is to] honor the injuries and crimes of the past
while creating the possibilities for new ways of being in the future”).
9. See Online Debate: Does Collective Remembrance of a Troubled Past
Impede Reconciliation, INT’L CTR. TRANSITIONAL JUST. (May 4, 2016),
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past, we must take into account the gendered dimensions of
violations. We have come a long way in acknowledging that while
everyone suffers during periods of armed conflict and repressive
regimes, “this suffering takes varied forms and gender is one of the
influencing factors.” 10 Failing to take into account the distinct
experiences of women and men, girls and boys, in conflict results in
incomplete narratives of violence and renders the gendered aspects
of violations invisible.
This section outlines the picture of sexual violence in each
conflict. Evidence of these crimes first came to light through truth
seeking and historical memory processes. The truth commission
reports addressing human rights abuses in the conflicts in Guatemala
and Peru revealed brutal sexual violence, in particular against women
from indigenous and rural communities. 11 In Colombia, reports from
human rights organizations and the Constitutional Court’s rulings
highlighted the extensive amount of sexual violence perpetrated by
armed actors in the conflict, the different categories of victims and
the multiple uses of this violence. 12 These documentation efforts
played an important role in making visible the nature, scale and
patterns of sexual violence in each conflict. They also marked a
turning point in the perception of these crimes and generated great
expectations regarding their prosecution, which were not always met.
The findings regarding the legal characterization of crimes and those
responsible also influenced the approaches later adopted by legal
https://www.ictj.org/news/online-debate-remembrance-reconciliation (providing
opinions for and against collective remembrance).
10. Brammertz & Jarvis, supra note 3, at 97-98 (noting that “over the past
decade, the impact of armed conflict on women has become a significant item on
the UN’s agenda”).
11. See generally COMISIÓN DE ESCLARECIMIENTO HISTÓRICO, GUATEMALA:
MEMORIA DE SILENCIO (1999), http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/
descargas/guatemala-memoria-silencio/guatemala-memoria-del-silencio.pdf
[hereinafter CEH Final Report] (addressing gross sexual violence abuses,
specifically against Mayans); Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación [Truth and
Reconciliation Commission], Informe Final [Final Report] (2003),
http://cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/ [hereinafter CVR Final Report] (focusing on sexual
violence perpetrated during the Peruvian conflict).
12. See generally Basta Ya! Colombia: Memorias de Guerra y Dignidad,
CENTRO
NACIONAL
DE
MEMORIA
HISTÓRICA
Ch.
2
(2013),
http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/descargas/informes2013/bastaYa/bas
ta-ya-colombia-memorias-de-guerra-y-dignidad-2016.pdf [hereinafter Historical
Memory Group 2013].
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practitioners to address this violence.

A. GUATEMALA
The 36-year long civil war in Guatemala (1960-1996) took a
tremendous toll on the civilian population, a toll that included
widespread sexual violence. 13 The conflict involved right-wing
government forces and various left-wing guerrilla groups seeking
democratic reforms and social justice. From the mid-1960s onwards,
within the context of its counterinsurgency campaign, Guatemalan
government forces unleashed a violent campaign against the civilian
population, mainly targeting the Mayan and peasant Ladino
communities. 14
The 1994 Oslo Agreement between the government and the
guerilla established the Commission for Historical Clarification
(Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, CEH), tasked with
documenting human rights abuses in the conflict. 15 Despite its
gender-neutral mandate, the CEH decided to include a gender
analysis in its 1999 Final Report, uncovering a larger truth that
included women’s experiences. 16 The Commission found that the
13. See Amandine Fulchiron et al., Weavings of the Soul: Memories of Mayan
Women Survivors of Sexual Violence During the Armed Conflict, IDRC (2009)
(providing a gendered analysis of the Guatemalan conflict and its impact on Mayan
women).
14. See CEH Final Report, supra note 11, at Ch. 1; RODDY BRETT, THE
ORIGINS AND DYNAMICS OF GENOCIDE: POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN GUATEMALA 12238 (2016) (analyzing in detail the government’s counterinsurgency campaign and
its impact).
15. See Recuperacion de la Memoria Historia, Conflict Research Consortium
Book Summary: Proyecto Interdiocesano Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica
(Guatemala), OTPIC, http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/example/remhi.htm
(last visited Nov. 1, 2016) [hereinafter Conflict Research Consortium Book
Summary] (stating that the Guatemalan Historical Clarification Commission
(CEH)−whose mandate covered the period from the start of the armed conflict to
the signing of the peace agreement in 1996−based its investigations, analysis and
findings on a report, Never Again, published by an unofficial precursor to the CEH,
the Recovery of Historical Memory (Recuperación de la Memoria
Historica−REMHI), led by the Human Rights Office of the Catholic Archdiocese);
see also MEMORY OF SILENCE: THE GUATEMALAN TRUTH COMMISSION REPORT
(Rothenberg ed., 2012) (providing an edited English version of the CEH’s final
report).
16. The CEH published its final report on 25 February 1999. See Vasuki
Nesiah et al., Truth Commissions and Gender: Principles, Policies, and
Procedures, INT’L CTR. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 41 (July 2006) (highlighting the
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government-led counterinsurgency campaign resulted in gross
human rights abuses against civilians, as well as in the genocide of
various Mayan communities in four regions of the country. 17 It also
found that state agents perpetrated widespread and systematic sexual
violence as part of its counterinsurgency campaign. 18 The CEH
documented 1465 cases of sexual violence, including cases of rape,
sexual slavery and torture. 19 In addition, it identified two modalities
of rape: selective rapes (which targeted specific victims, such as
female human rights defenders and female detainees) and massive
rapes (referring to the indiscriminate and systematic use of rape
alongside other violations, for example during attacks on Mayan
villages). 20 Regarding ethnicity, 88 per cent of victims of sexual
violence were Mayan, 10 per cent were Ladina and 1 per cent
belonged to other groups. 21 While the main focus of the CEH’s
report was on female victims, it acknowledged the existence of cases
of male sexual violence. 22 The CEH concluded that, along with
torture, rape was one of the human rights violations that most
importance of addressing gender violence and providing strategies for future truth
commissions to analyze this issue).
17. See CEH Final Report, supra note 11, Section IX at ¶¶ 1731-57 (Statistical
summary); see also CEH Final Report, supra note 11, Section XVIII at ¶ 2901
(Violations against the Rights of Existence, Integrity and Cultural Identity of
Indigenous Peoples); CEH Final Report, supra note 11, Section XXI (Genocide)
(determining that over 200,000 Guatemalans were killed in the conflict, mostly of
Mayan ethnicity, and the repression was so overwhelming it reached the definition
of genocide); BRETT, supra note 14, at 141 (arguing that “the genocide strategy
represented, at least in the short term, an effective and successful policy decision
through which to eliminate the threat of revolution and impede the transformation
of Guatemala’s oligarchic social order into a land ruled by subversives, ‘indians’
and primitives.”).
18. See CEH Final Report, supra note 11, at ¶¶ 2351, 2393 (Sexual Violence
against Women). These acts were not isolated but part of a planned strategy by
government forces. See also CEH Final Report, supra note 11, at ¶¶ 2398, 247678.
19. CEH Final Report, supra note 11, at ¶ 2388 (Sexual Violence against
Women).
20. See id. at ¶¶ 2401-12, 2469-2477, 2479 (Sexual Violence against Women).
The CEH highlighted that the type of harm inflicted on the victims was determined
by their gender. For example, during massacres, government forces would separate
men and women. While both groups would be killed, the women were raped prior
to being killed.
21. Id. at ¶ 2390.
22. See id. at ¶ 2351, 2376 (Fig. 1: percentage of documented violations by
sex).
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contributed to generating and maintaining state terror during the
conflict, and that it was committed with the intention to destroy the
victims’ identity and dignity in a profound way. 23
Justice for conflict-related crimes, in particular for sexual
violence, has been elusive in the years following the end to
Guatemala’s civil war. With a troubled history of violence against
women, crimes of sexual violence have largely remained
unpunished, and victims have faced significant barriers to access
justice. 24 To break the silence surrounding these crimes, a Tribunal
of Conscience for Women Survivors of Sexual Violence during the
Armed Conflict in Guatemala was held on 4-5 March 2010 in
Guatemala City. 25 This civil society initiative was organized by
different women’s and survivors’ organizations seeking to push for
accountability for these crimes, and it marked an important moment
in the truth-telling process of past crimes. Its main objectives were to
allow women to speak about sexual violence they had suffered
during the conflict, to raise awareness of issues of justice and redress
for women survivors within their communities, and to prepare the
groundwork for these crimes to be prosecuted domestically. 26 Since
then, two court cases, the Ríos Montt and the Sepur Zarco cases,
have addressed sexual violence crimes, with different outcomes.
The Ríos Montt case was the first domestic trial against a former
head of state for crimes of genocide. 27 In May 2013, the High Risk
23. See MEMORY OF SILENCE: THE GUATEMALAN TRUTH COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 15, at 153 (explaining the consequences of torture and rape);
see also CEH Final Report, supra note 11, at ¶¶ 2482-83 (Sexual Violence against
Women) (noting the profound impact of sexual violence on the victims and their
communities).
24. See, e.g., Alison Crosby & M. Brinton Lykes, Mayan Women Survivors
Speak: The Gendered Relations of Truth Telling in Postwar Guatemala, 5 INT’L J.
TRANSNATIONAL JUST. 456, 457-58 (2011) (highlighting the role of Guatemalan
civil society in pushing for accountability for sexual violence in response to
entrenched impunity and weak state response).
25. See id. at 456-76 (explaining the Tribunal’s structure and purpose). The
tribunal was organized as a mock trial, with prosecutors, judges and testimonies of
women survivors and experts.
26. See id. at 457.
27. See Tribunal Primero de Sentencia Penal, Narcoactividad y Delitos contra
el Medioambiente [First Tribunal for Crime, Drug Trafficking and Environmental
Offences], “José Mauricio Rodríguez y José Efraín Ríos Montt,”, C-01076-201100015 (Guat.) [hereinafter Ríos Montt case]. A separate but related case against
Ríos Montt and others was brought in Spain under the Spanish law for universal
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Tribunal “A” found José Efraín Ríos Montt, former president of
Guatemala, guilty for committing genocide against the Mayan Ixil
population during his de facto 1982-1983 rule and for crimes against
the duties of humanity, sentencing him to 80 years in prison. 28 His
co-accused and former chief of military intelligence, José Mauricio
Rodríguez Sánchez, was acquitted. 29 The trial was marred with
challenges by the defence. 30 The conviction against Ríos Montt was
short-lived, as just a few days later in a controversial ruling, the
Constitutional Court ruled that his due process rights had been
violated and invalidated the proceedings, effectively vacating the
judgment. 31 After several false starts, a retrial against both accused
jurisdiction. In 1999, Mayan activist and Nobel Peace Prize winner Rigoberta
Menchú and others filed a lawsuit before the Spanish National Court against Ríos
Montt and others for crimes of genocide, terrorism and torture. In June 2011, two
NGOs, the Center for Justice and Accountability and Women’s Link Worldwide,
filed a request before the Spanish National Court for the charges to be revised to
include crimes of sexual violence, and presented the evidence of two expert
witnesses. Although the Constitutional Court of Guatemala has declared that Spain
lacks jurisdiction in this case, and has not complied with arrests warrants issued by
Spain, the case in Spain remains open. See Genocidio en Guatemala: Ríos Montt
Culpable,
FIDH,
6-7
(2013),
https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/informe_
guatemala613esp2013.pdf; see also Incorporación de los Crímenes de Género en
el Caso del Genocidio Guatemalteco (1960-1996), WOMEN’S LINK WORLDWIDE
(Aug. 5, 2011), http://www2.womenslinkworldwide.org/wlw/new.php?modo=
detalle_proyectos&dc=22.
28. Tribunal Primero de Sentencia Penal, Narcoactividad y Delitos contra el
Medioambiente [First Tribunal for Crime, Drug Trafficking and Environmental
Offences], 10/5/2013, “José Mauricio Rodríguez y José Efraín Ríos Montt,” C01076-2011-00015, 702-705 (Guat.) [hereinafter Ríos Montt Judgment].
29. See id, at ¶¶ 702-05.
30. See Judging a Dictator: The Trial of Guatemala’s Ríos Montt, OPEN
SOC’Y JUST. INITIATIVE, 9-11 (2013), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/
sites/default/files/judging-dicatator-trial-guatemala-rios-montt-11072013.pdf
(criticizing the defense’s excessive use of “amparos” or habeas corpus writs to
challenge constitutional or legal rights); see also Marco Antonio Canteo, Impactos
del juicio por genocidio en el sistema de justicia de Guatemala, in RETOS
ACTUALES DE LA JUSTICIA POR CRÍMENES DEL PASADO (REVISTA DE LA
FUNDACIÓN PARA EL DEBIDO PROCESO (DPLF)) 47-48 (2013) (noting that the
defense was allowed to abuse the legal process and filed numerous motions and
challenges).
31. See Emi MacLean, Guatemala’s Constitutional Court Overturns Rios
Montt Conviction and Sends Trial Back to April 19, INT’L JUST. MONITOR (May
21, 2013), http://www.ijmonitor.org/2013/05/constitutional-court-overturns-riosmontt-conviction-and-sends-trial-back-to-april-19/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2016)
(overturning the ruling based on Montt’s challenge that the appellate court’s order
was not fully complied with by the trial court, even though the appellate court

KRAVETZ- FINAL PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

716

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

2/23/2017 12:40 PM

[32:3

began in March 2016. 32 In 2015, Ríos Montt had been declared unfit
to stand trial, so the retrial was unlikely to result in a conviction
against him and the proceedings were held behind closed doors. 33
The civil parties challenged the legality of these proceedings and
argued that Rodríguez Sánchez should be tried separately and
publicly. In June 2016, the Appeals Court granted the request by the
civil parties and suspended the trial indefinitely. 34 The future of the
case is now uncertain. It exemplifies the weakness of the Guatemalan
justice system in providing redress to victims, in particular in cases
involving high-level accused. 35
The Sepur Zarco judgment marks a historic precedent that breaks
recognized the trial court as having fully complied); see also Mike McDonald,
Guatemala’s Top Court Annuls Rios Montt Genocide Conviction, REUTERS (May
21,
2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-guatemala-riosmonttidUSBRE94K04I20130521 (explaining the trial should be suspended until all
challenges in the case have been settled).
32. See Jo-Marie Burt, Ríos Montt Genocide Retrial Starts Amidst
Controversy,
INT’L
JUST.
MONITOR
(Mar.
21,
2016),
http://www.ijmonitor.org/2016/03/rios-montt-genocide-retrial-starts-amidstcontroversy/ (discussing the procedural background to the restart of the
proceedings and the challenges raised by civil parties to the legality of the
proceedings).
33. See Sophie Beaudoin, Court Orders Rios Montt and Rodriguez Sanchez
Retrial to Begin in January 2016, INT’L JUST. MONITOR (Aug. 26, 2015),
http://www.ijmonitor.org/2015/08/court-orders-rios-montt-and-rodriguez-sanchezretrial-to-begin-in-january-2016/ [hereinafter Rios Montt and Rodriguez Sanchez
Retrial] (explaining the legal basis in Guatemalan law for the special procedure
applied in this case).
34. See Jo-Marie Burt, Appeals Court Upholds Suspension of Ríos Montt
Genocide
Trial,
INT’L
JUST.
MONITOR
(June
3,
2016),
http://www.ijmonitor.org/2016/06/appeals-court-upholds-suspension-of-riosmontt-genocide-trial/ (noting that the civil parties argued that conducting a trial
under an illegal format would likely result in a mistrial or a suspension of the
proceedings); see also Manuela Cencetti, La Dignidad Ixil Mantiene la Esperanza
de un Juicio por el Genocido en Guatemala, DIAGONAL (May 19, 2016),
https://www.diagonalperiodico.net/global/30405-guatemala-efrain-rios-montttestigos-nebaj-genocidio-ixil.html.
35. Cf. Judging a Dictator: The Trial of Guatemala’s Rios Montt, supra note
30, at 2, n.10 (explaining that before the trial of Ríos Montt, almost “all the nearly
30 people convicted for crimes committed during the country’s internal armed
conflict were low-level soldiers, police, paramilitaries, or members of the civilian
patrols established by the military” and highlighting the exception of the
conviction of former military commissioner, Felipe Cusanero, in August 2009 for
forced disappearance); Canteo, supra note 30, at 48 (noting that the Rios Montt
trial made evident the weaknesses in the Guatemalan justice system).
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with the entrenched impunity for sexual violence. 36 It is the first case
in Guatemala to focus primarily on sexual violence crimes against
indigenous women perpetrated during the country’s internal conflict.
The crimes took place in Sepur Zarco, a small Mayan Q’eqchi’
community located in eastern Guatemala. This community suffered
extreme repression during the conflict, particularly during the 1980s.
The case concerns crimes of rape, sexual and domestic slavery,
murder, and cruel and degrading treatment perpetrated by the
military stationed outside the village. The case arose from a lawsuit
filed in 2011 by two Guatemalan women’s rights organizations,
Women Transforming the World (Mujeres Transformando el
Mundo) and the National Union of Guatemalan Women (Unión
Nacional de Mujeres Guatemaltecas), who are co-representing a
group of victims. The accused are the former commander of the
Sepur Zarco military base, retired lieutenant colonel Esteelmer
Francisco Reyes Girón, and the former military commissioner in the
area, Heriberto Valdez Asig. 37 In 2014, the two accused were
arrested in connection with these crimes, 38 and they were tried and
convicted of all charges in February 2016. 39 The case is currently
under appeal. Both cases are discussed in further detail in Part II.
36. Tribunal Primero de Sentencia Penal, Narcoactividad y Delitos contra el
Medioambiente [First Tribunal for Crime, Drug Trafficking and Environmental
Offences], Feb. 26 2016, “Esteelmer Francisco Reyes Girón, Heriberto Valdez
Asig”, C-01076-2012-00021 (Guat.) [hereinafter Sepur Zarco Judgment].
37. See Guatemala Makes History with a Landmark Military Sexual Violence
Trial, WOLA (Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.wola.org/2016/02/guatemala-makeshistory-with-a-landmark-military-sexual-violence-trial/ [hereinafter Guatemala
Makes History] (noting this is the first time in Guatemala that crimes of sexual
violence have been tried as international crimes); see also Monitoring Guatemala,
2 Found Guilty in Historic Sepur Zarco Sexual Slavery Case, GHRC (Mar. 3,
2016), https://ghrcusa.wordpress.com/tag/violence-against-women/.
38. See Sepur Zarco Sexual Slavery Case, GUAT. HUM. RTS. COMM’N,
http://www.ghrc-usa.org/our-work/important-cases/sepur-zarco/#sepurzarcohistory
(last visited Sept. 23, 2016) (providing a historical timeline of the developments in
the case).
39. See Sepur Zarco Judgment, supra note 36, at 503, 507-08. The Tribunal
sentenced both accused to 30 years in prison. Valdez Asig was also sentenced to
210 additional years in prison for the enforced disappearance of seven men, and
Reyes Girón to an additional 90 years for the murder of three other women. See
also Sophie Beaudoin, Sepur Zarco Trial to Start in February, INT’L JUST.
MONITOR (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.ijmonitor.org/2015/11/sepur-zarco-trial-tostart-in-february/ (summarizing the case’s history and expected testimony at the
trial).
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The victims in the Sepur Zarco and Ríos Montt cases showed
incredible courage in challenging impunity for these crimes three
decades after they occurred. Without their unwavering perseverance
and advocacy, these cases would not have been possible. However,
Guatemala’s progress in coming to terms with its violent past has
been painfully slow. 40 It remains to be seen whether these precedents
will open the door to further prosecutions concerning sexual
violence.

B. PERU
Peru’s twenty-year conflict began in the 1980s with violent
insurgencies led by a left-wing rebel group known as Shining Path
(Sendero Luminoso). 41 During its crackdown on this armed group,
the Peruvian state perpetrated systematic abuses against the civilian
population, in particular against those suspected of collaborating
with the rebels. 42 Small, rural and indigenous communities of the
Andes and Amazon were particularly affected by this violence. 43
The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Comisión de
Verdad y Reconciliación, CVR), set up in 2001,44 made important
inroads in identifying sexual violence as a human rights violation in
the conflict and in recording individual cases. 45 Up until the CVR’s
40. See Judging a Dictator: The Trial of Guatemala’s Rios Montt, supra note
30, at 1 (noting progress has been slow in Guatemala in prosecuting conflictrelated atrocities).
41. See generally CVR Final Report, supra note 11, at Vol. I, Part I, Ch. 1, 5977.
42. See id. at Vol. VI, Part IV, Ch. 1.
43. See id. at Vol. VIII, Part II, Ch. 2.2.
44. The CVR was established to investigate human rights abuses perpetrated
between 1980 and 2000 by the State, the Shining Path and the Movimiento
Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (MRTA). See Julissa Mantilla Falcón, La
judicialización de la violencia sexual, PUENTES: EDICIÓN ESPECIAL 45 (June
2015); see also CVR Final Report, supra note 11, at 25-27; Creación de la
Comisión de la Verdad en el Perú, Decreto Supremo No. 065-200-PCM (June 4,
2001); see also Modifican Denominación de la Comisión de la Verdad por la de la
Comisión de la Verdad y Reconiliacion, Decreto Supremo No. 101-2001-PCM
(Aug. 31, 2001).
45. See CVR Final Report, supra note 11, at Vol. VI, Part IV, Ch. 1.1.5, 27778, 343-44 (stating that during the conflict, there was a practice of sexual violence,
mainly against women, perpetrated primarily by state agents and, to a lesser
degree, by members of subversive groups. In examining the multiple purposes of
this violence, the CVR concluded that these acts were aimed at punishing,
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establishment, sexual violence crimes were considered isolated
events, unconnected to the conflict, and the full scale of the
phenomenon was unknown. 46 Although not an official part of its
mandate, the CVR paid particular attention to gender in its 2003
Final Report. 47 By interpreting its mandate broadly, it uncovered
widespread sexual violence against women, “especially young,
indigenous women, perpetrated by the army and the police.” 48 It also
uncovered ample evidence of sexual violence by the Shining Path,
despite the group’s often-contradictory rhetoric against it. 49 The
intimidating, pressuring, and humiliating the population); see generally Katya
Salazar Luzula, Gender, Sexual Violence and Criminal Law in Post-Conflict Peru,
in THE LEGACY OF TRUTH: CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE PERUVIAN TRANSITION 56-69
(Lisa Magarrell & Leonardo Filippini eds. 2006) (describing the work of the CVR
in addressing sexual violence).
46. See Mantilla Falcón, supra note 44, at 42; see also CVR Final Report,
supra note 11, at Vol. IV, Part VI, Ch. 1.1.5, 275 (noting that one of the factors
that contributed to rendering sexual violence invisible in the conflict was that it
often occurred alongside other human rights violations (massacres, arbitrary
detentions and torture), which resulted in a lack of attention paid to sexual
violence. It also stated that sexual violence was often viewed as collateral damage
of armed conflict, and not as a human rights violation).
47. See CVR Final Report, supra note 11, at Vol. VI, Part IV, Ch. 1.1.5, 26372. The CVR applied international law to support its gender-inclusive
interpretation of its mandate. In particular, it relied on international and regional
human rights instruments to define sexual violence as a form of torture, and on the
jurisprudence of the international criminal ad hoc tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda to characterize sexual violence as a crime against
humanity and as a war crime. In its Final Report, the CVR included two sections
on gender: the first analyzes how women and men experienced the conflict in a
differentiated manner; the second deals specifically with different forms sexual
violence against women, including rape, sexual slavery, forced cohabitation,
forced pregnancies, and forced abortions. It also addressed cases of male sexual
violence. See also Mantilla Falcón, supra note 44, at 42-45; see also Nesiah, supra
note 16, at 4 (noting increased attention paid to gender in the CVR’s report but
highlighting Peruvian feminists belief that the truth commission process was a lost
opportunity for a more systematic and thorough engagement).
48. BOESTEN, supra note 4, at 3; see CVR Final Report, supra note 11, at Vol.
VI, Part IV, Ch. 1.1.5, 277-78, 304-57 (describing in detail the sexual violence by
state agents); see also Mantilla Falcón, supra note 44, at 42-45. Mantilla notes that
the explanations state agents provided to the CVR regarding sexual violence give
insights into their perception of the lack of gravity of these crimes. For example,
members of the police who testified before the CVR stated that sexual violence
was the consequence of “the irrationality of the males and the distance from their
partners, as well as the solitude of the remote areas where they were posted.” Many
did not view rape as a form of torture.
49. See BOESTEN, supra note 4, at 4 (contrasting the Shining Path’s strict rules
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CVR’s findings showed that racial and cultural discrimination of
Andean and indigenous populations played a fundamental role in this
violence. 50
In total, the CVR documented 538 cases of wartime rape,
including 11 cases against males. 51 While the CVR did not explicitly
state that sexual violence by state agents had been systematic, it did
indicate that acts of sexual violence might have reached the level of a
systematic practice in some provinces of Ayacucho, Huancavelica
and Apurímac in the context of the government’s counterinsurgency
campaign. 52 This finding is significant in establishing the liability of
senior-level leaders for these acts. At the completion of its mandate,
the CVR referred forty-seven cases to the Ministry of Public
Prosecution for further assessment and investigation, three of which
involved sexual violence against women: MMB (involving crimes of
sexual violence as torture against a female detainee); military bases
of Manta and Vilca (involving widespread sexual violence); and
Chumbivilcas (involving massacres, enforced disappearances and
sexual violence). 53 These cases are examined in further detail in Part
II.
Despite the CVR’s findings, the Peruvian judiciary has
persistently ignored sexual violence crimes perpetrated during the
conflict. Key trials concerning grave violations have focused on
other crimes, such as massacres and enforced disappearances. 54 The
against adultery, rape, prostitution, and homosexuality, with their involvement in
these forbidden activities which led to forced marriages, forced pregnancies,
infanticide, sexual torture and sexual slavery); see also CVR Final Report, supra
note 11, at Vol. VI, Part IV, Ch. 1.1.5, 277-78, 280-300 (providing a detailed
description of the different contexts and forms of sexual violence by subversive
groups). The report also refers to cases of sexual violence by the MRTA.
50. According to the CVR’s estimates, 80% of the over 69,000 dead and
disappeared were young men of indigenous descent. Most of the women affected
by the conflict lived in the departments of Ayacucho, Huancavelica and Apurímac,
three of the poorest areas in the country. Their profile was fairly similar to that of
the men: low income, mostly Quechua speakers (73%), from rural areas (80%).
See CVR Final Report, supra note 11, at Vol. VIII, Part II, Ch. 2.2; see also
Salazar Luzula, supra note 45, at 57 (suggesting the sexual violence in Ayacucho,
Huancavelica and Apurímac constituted a systematic practice); see also CVR Final
Report, supra note 11, at Vol. VIII, Part II, Ch. 2.1, 47-48.
51. CVR Final Report, supra note 11, at Vol. VIII, Part II, Ch. 2.2, 66.
52. See id. at Vol. VI, Part IV, Ch. 1.1.5, 304.
53. See Mantilla Falcón, supra note 44, at 42.
54. See id. (noting that current cases in Peru are mainly focused on crimes by
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CVR’s Final Report has become a crucial platform for the human
rights movement in Peru. Relying on this report, civil parties have
launched a number of other cases of sexual violence, and some are
currently pending before the courts but proceeding slowly. 55
Although in 2004 the judiciary established specialized courts for
cases of grave human rights abuses perpetrated in the conflict, 56 in
practice this reform has not sped up trials nor improved
accountability for sexual violence. 57 In several decisions, 58 the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights has addressed the persistent failure
government security forces, as members of subversive groups have been
prosecuted, albeit not for sexual violence crimes).
55. See Mantilla Falcón, supra note 44, at 42; see also discussion infra pp. 1821.
56. See Defensoría del Pueblo, Resumen Ejecutivo: Informe Defensorial No
162, A diez años de verdad, justicia y reparación. Avances, retrocesos y desafíos
de un proceso inconcluso (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2013), 22-25,
www.verdadyreconciliacionperu.com/admin/files/articulos/1771_digitalizacion.pdf
(describing challenges and delays in trials concerning grave human rights abuses).
57. See Gisela Astocondor Salazar et al., La judicialización de la violencia
sexual en el conflicto armado en Perú: A propósito de los recientes estándares
internacionales de derechos humanos desarrollados en la jurisprudencia de la
Corte IDH, 53 REVISTA IIDH 213, 218 (2011). Between 2005 and 2013, the
National Criminal Chamber issued 97 rulings concerning cases of grave human
rights abuses, none of which included sexual violence charges. A report issued by
the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean in 2012
indicated only 16 cases of conflict-related sexual were under investigation, of
which 13 were in the preliminary investigation phase by the Public Prosecution
Office and 3 were before the judiciary. See also Mantilla Falcón, supra note 44, at
44; see also Defensoría del Pueblo, supra. 56, at 20-21; DIANE ALMÉRAS & CORAL
CALDERÓN, SI NO SE CUENTA, NO CUENTA: INFORMACIÓN SOBRE LA VIOLENCIA
CONTRA LAS MUJERES 44 (2012), http://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/
11362/27859/ 1/S2012012_es.pdf.
58. See, e.g., J v. Peru, IACtHR Series C No 275, Judgment (Preliminary
Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 27 November 2013), 126 ¶15
(instructing the Peruvian State to “conduct an effective criminal investigation into
the acts committed against Ms. J. that violated her personal integrity in order to
establish criminal liability”); Case of the Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru,
Judgment (Merits, Reparations and Costs, 25 November 2006),Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
(ser. C) No. 160, at 166 ¶ 8 (Nov. 25, 2006) (calling on the Peruvian State to
investigate the facts in the case, and identify those responsible and conduct
criminal proceedings against them); Fernando and Raquel Mejia v Peru (Decision
of 1 March 1996) Report No 5/ 96, case no 10.970, in Annual Report of the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights 1995 OEA/ Ser.L/ V/ II.91, 182-8, at
Section VII ¶3 (recommending that the Peruvian State conduct a thorough, rapid
and impartial investigation into the sexual abuse of Raquel Mejía in order to
identify and punish the perpetrators).
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of the Peruvian State to properly tackle sexual violence and has
called on the State to comply with its duty to investigate and
prosecute these violations. This inaction and indifference sends
victims an implicit message that their crimes are of secondary
importance. 59

C. COLOMBIA
The origins of Colombia’s 50-year conflict are complex, and its
impact on the civilian population devastating. An armed struggle
between government forces and different left-wing guerrilla groups
began in the 1960s, arising from demands for social and land reforms
The most significant groups to emerge were the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de
Colombia, FARC) and the National Liberation Army (Ejercito de
Liberación Nacional, ELN). In the 1980s, as a backlash to the
actions of guerrilla groups and the inaction of government forces,
different right-wing paramilitary groups were formed in the areas of
greatest guerrilla presence, eventually consolidating as the United
Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Auto Defensas Unidas de
Colombia, AUC) in the late 1990s. Violent competition for control of
territory and resources (including drug-trafficking routes) ensued
between guerrilla groups and paramilitaries, with paramilitaries at
times acting jointly with government forces. 60 Civilians have borne
the brunt of this violence. 61
Sexual violence has been a prevalent and constant feature in the
conflict. In its rulings, Colombia’s Constitutional Court has
recognized the extensive and systematic nature of sexual violence in
59. See BOESTEN, supra note 4, at 119 (arguing that impunity for cases of
sexual violence is mainly shaped by the institutional sexism and racism that
permeate the judiciary, as much as wider society in which these crimes were
perpetrated).
60. See Historical Memory Group 2013, supra note 12, at Ch. 2 (documenting
the origins dynamics, and different periods of the conflict); Tribunal Superior de
Bogotá [T. Sup. Bogota] [Superior Tribunal of Bogotá], Sala de Justicia y Paz
febrero 24, 2015, 110016000253200883612-00 (Colom.), ¶¶ 212, 313-14, 355-56
[hereinafter Villa Zapata Judgment] (referring to different forms of criminal
collaboration between government forces and paramilitaries in the region of
Arauca).
61. See Historical Memory Group 2013, supra note 12, at Ch. 1 (documenting
the vast impact of the conflict on the civilian population, the patterns of violence
and the perpetrator groups).
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the conflict, 62 and has stressed that sexual violence has taken on
multiple forms and has been perpetrated by all armed actors. 63 The
Historical Memory Group (Grupo de Memoria Histórica)−a nonjudicial body established in 2005 to contribute to the reconstruction
of the truth of the conflict−has documented the multiple forms and
purposes of sexual violence perpetrated by the different armed
actors. 64 Different human rights organizations have also documented
62. In a landmark ruling in 2008, the Constitutional Court stressed that sexual
violence is “a habitual, extensive, systematic and invisible practice in the context
of the Colombian armed conflict”. In a confidential annex to this decision, it
referred 183 incidents of sexual violence to the Attorney General’s Office for
investigation and prosecution. In a follow-up ruling in 2015, the Constitutional
Court highlighted the ongoing prevalence of sexual violence, noting that all parties
to the conflict were responsible for such crimes. It also referred 442 incidents of
sexual violence to the Attorney General’s Office for follow-up. See Corte
Constitucional [C.C.][Constitutional Court], Auto 092, abril 14, 2008, M.P: M. J.
Cepeda Espinosa, Sala Segunda, Protección de los derechos fundamentales de las
mujeres víctimas del desplazamiento forzado por causa del conflicto armado
[hereinafter Auto 092/2008] (referring to the prevailing high rates of sexual
violence by armed actors against displaced women); see also Corte Constitucional
[C.C][Constitutional Court], Auto 009, enero 27, 2015, M.P.: L. E. Vargas Silva,
6-13 [hereinafter Auto 009/2015] (highlighting the lack of progress by authorities
in providing redress and justice to victims of sexual violence); Tribunal Superior
de Bogotá [T. Sup. Bogotá] [Superior Tribunal of Bogotá], Sala de Justicia y Paz,
diciembre 1, 2011, 1100160002532008-83194 (Colom.), ¶ 87 [hereinafter Peña
Tobón Judgment] (acknowledging that sexual violence has been a constant feature
in the Colombian conflict).
63. See Auto 092/2008, supra note 62, at III.1.1.1-2.
64. The Historical Memory Group was tasked under Law 975 of 2005 with
producing a report on the origins and causes of the armed conflict in Colombia.
While it has not fulfilled the role of a truth commission, it has conducted
independent research on human rights abuses with a victim-oriented approach. It
has also produced a number of reports addressing gender-based violence in the
conflict. In 2013, this entity became the National Center for Historical Memory.
See, e.g., Mujeres y Guerra. Víctimas y Resistentes en el Caribe Colombiano,
CENTRO NACIONAL DE MEMORIA HISTÓRICA (2011), http://www.centrodememoria
historica.gov.co/descargas/informes2013/bastaYa/basta-ya-colombia-memoriasde-guerra-y-dignidad-2016.pdf [hereinafter Historical Memory Group 2011]
(documenting human rights abuses by paramilitary groups against women and girls
in the Caribbean Coast); Crímenes Que No Prescriben: La Violencia Sexual del
Bloque Vencedores de Arauca, CENTRO NACIONAL DE MEMORÍA HISTÓRICA, 5987, 107-60 (2015), http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/descargas/
informes2016/crimenes-que-no-prescriben/crimenes-que-no-prescriben.pdf
(documenting gender-based violence against women by different armed actors in
Arauca province, northern Colombia); see also Pilar Riaño Alcalá and María
Victoria Uribe, Constructing Memory amidst War: The Historical Memory Group
of
Colombia,
INT’L
L.
TRANSITIONAL
JUST.,
1,
9
(2016),
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the large-scale commission of sexual violence 65 and its organized
nature. 66 While documentation efforts have predominantly focused
on female victims, there is now increased recognition of male sexual
violence in the conflict. 67 Different aspects of this violence have also
http://ijtj.oxfordjournals.org/content/10/1/6. full.pdf+html (explaining the role of
the Historical Memory Group and its investigative work with a focus on victims’
narratives).
65. See, e.g., Olga Amparo Sanchez, et al., First Survey on the Prevalence of
Sexual Violence against Women in the Context of the Colombian Armed Conflict,
2001-2009, OXFAM, 7 (2011), http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/Resources/
NGO/vaw_violenceagainstwomenincolombiaarmedconflict_2011.pdf (indicating
that high prevalence of sexual violence between 2001-2009 in the municipalities
with the presence of armed groups); see also This is what we Demand: Justice!
Impunity for Sexual Violence Against Women in Colombia’s Armed conflict,
AMNESTY INT’L, 23 (Sept. 2011), http://www.amnesty.nl/sites/default/files/
public/1109_rap_colombia.pdf [hereinafter This is What We Demand]
(highlighting the entrenched impunity for conflict-related sexual violence by all
armed actors in Colombia).
66. See Colombia: Scarred Bodies, Hidden Crimes: Sexual Violence against
Women in the Armed Conflict, AMNESTY INT’L, 3, 7, 11, 17 (October 13, 2004),
https://www.amnesty.nl/sites/default/files/public/2004_colombia.pdf (arguing that
armed groups have perpetrated sexual violence to sow terror, obtain territorial
control, inflict revenge on adversaries, and exploit victims, among other reasons);
see also Guía para llevar casos de violencia sexual, CORPORACION HUMANAS, 2327 (2009), http://www.humanas.org.co/archivos/Guia_para_llevar_casos_de_
violencia_sexual.pdf (indicating that sexual violence has been perpetrated by
armed groups within four contexts: during attacks on localities, to obtain territorial
control, in detention, and within ranks); see also Historical Memory Group 2013,
supra note 12, at 80-84 (describing different contexts in which sexual violence has
been perpetrated by paramilitaries); see also Auto 092/2008, supra 62, at III.1.1.12 (referring to different patterns of sexual violence by armed actors in the conflict);
see also Auto 009/2015, supra note 62, at 15-27 (referring to the contextual risk
factors that contribute to sexual violence by armed actors and the different
scenarios in which these crimes are committed).
67. See, e.g., Tribunal Superior de Bogotá [T. Sup. Bogota] [Superior Tribunal
of Bogotá], Sala de Justicia y Paz diciembre 16, 2014, 11001-22-52000-201400058-0 (Colom.), ¶¶ 956, 988, 991 [hereinafter Triana Mahecha Judgment]
(recognizing that men and boys can also be victims of sexual violence, and
providing specific recommendations to the Attorney General’s Office on how to
examine evidence of male sexual violence, and providing specific
recommendations to the Attorney General’s Office on how to examine evidence of
male sexual violence); see also Villa Zapata Judgment, supra note 60, ¶ 666
(referring to the prevalence and lack of visibility of male sexual violence); see also
Fiscalía General de la Nación, Resolución 01774, Protocolo de investigación de
violencia sexual: Guía de buenas prácticas y lineamientos para la investigación
penal y judicialización de delitos de violencia sexual, (June 14, 2016) ¶ 48-52
[hereinafter 2016 Sexual Violence Protocol] (acknowledging that one of the myths
about sexual violence is that men and boys cannot be victimized, and providing
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emerged, such as the vulnerability to sexual violence of marginalized
communities−in particular the Afro-Colombian and indigenous
communities 68− and the targeting of women and men because of
their sexual orientation. 69
As in Guatemala and Peru, Colombian judicial authorities have
routinely ignored these crimes, and impunity has been rife. 70 In
guidelines to investigators and prosecutors on how to address male sexual
violence).
68. See e.g., Historical Memory Group 2013, supra note 12, at 278-81; see
also Sexual Violence in Colombia: Instrument of War, OXFAM, 3 (Sept. 9, 2009),
https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp-sexual-violencecolombia.pdf (referring to the triple discrimination against women from AfroColombian and indigenous communities because of their gender, ethnicity and
their situation of poverty); see also Historical Memory Group 2011, supra note 64,
at Chs. 2, 3 (documenting gender-based violence by paramilitaries against women
in the Caribbean Coast region); see also U.N. Secretary General, Conflict-Related
Sexual Violence: Report of the Secretary-General, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. A/66/657–
S/2012/33 (Jan. 13, 2012) (referring to the disproportionate impact of sexual
violence on Afro-Colombian and indigenous women and girls).
69. Several recent decisions of the transitional justice system have highlighted
the prevalence of violence against persons on the basis of their sexual orientation.
See, e.g., Triana Mahecha Judgment, supra note 67, ¶¶ 220-21, 229, 1042
(describing murders of men by paramilitaries on the basis of their sexual
orientation, and recommending that the Attorney General Office treat violence on
the basis of sexual orientation as a specific category of violation); see also Triana
Mahecha Judgment, supra note 67, at 957 ¶ 55-6 (calling on the Attorney
General’s Office to focus on examining possible patterns of violence against
LGBT community based on their sexual orientation), see also Villa Zapata
Judgment, supra note 60, ¶¶ 657-66, 749-53 (referring to different forms of
violence against the LGBT community by armed actors, and reviewing domestic
jurisprudence regarding crimes by paramilitary groups against persons on the basis
of their sexual orientation); see also Tribunal Superior de Bogotá [T. Sup. Bogota]
[Superior Tribunal of Bogotá], Sala de Justicia y Paz, noviembre 20, 2014, 11-00122-52-000-2014-00027 (Colom.), ¶¶ 1903-09 [hereinafter Mancuso Judgment]
(finding that AUC members murdered a victim because of his sexual orientation as
part of their “social cleansing” policy); see also Tribunal Superior de Medellin [T.
Sup. Medellin] [Superior Tribunal of Medellin], Sala de Justicia y Paz, febrero 2,
2015, 110016000253200680018 (Colom.), at 1331-1333 [hereinafter Vanoy
Murillo Judgment]; see also Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court],
septiembre 15, 2015, Sentencia T-025 DE 2004 (Colom.), ¶¶ 14-15 [hereinafter
Sentencia T-025 DE 2004 (referring to violence by paramilitaries against members
of the LGBT community); see also Auto 009/2015, supra 62, at 14-15 (referring to
reports of violence by armed actors against women on the basis of their sexual
orientation).
70. See, e.g., Acceso a la Justicia para Mujeres Víctimas de Violencia Sexual,
Sexto Informe de Seguimiento al Auto 092 y Primer Informe de Seguimiento al
Auto 009 de la Corte Constitucional- Anexos Reservados, MESA DE SEGUIMIENTO,
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January of 2015, Colombia’s Constitutional Court noted “with
alarm” the persistence of sexual violence as a serious form of gender
discrimination, and urged authorities to not only address these
crimes, but to comply with their obligations to prevent and ensure
their non-repetition. 71 In the context of its ongoing preliminary
examination in Colombia, the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) has repeatedly called on Colombia to comply
with its international obligations to prosecute sexual violence. 72
Given the increased pressure to step up its efforts, the Attorney
General’s Office has taken measures to prioritize the investigation of
sexual violence. 73 While investigations and prosecutions before the
ordinary justice system have proceeded at a slow pace, 74 some
13-17 (March 2016) [hereinafter Working Group’s 2016 Report] (noting the
almost total impunity in the over 600 sexual violence cases referred to the Attorney
General’s Office by the Constitutional Court in its rulings Auto 092 of 2008 and
Auto 009 of 2015); see also Colombia: Women, Conflict-Related Sexual Violence
and the Peace Process, ABCOLOMBIA, 1-2, 13-16 (November 2013) (reporting
high levels of impunity for sexual violence and significant barriers for victims to
access justice); see also Situation in Colombia: Interim Report, ICC: OFFICE OF
THE PROSECUTOR, ¶ 19 (November 2012) [hereinafter Situation in Colombia:
Interim Report] (noting the limited number of proceedings concerning “rape and
other forms of sexual violence committed in the context of armed conflict, despite
the scale of the phenomenon”).
71. See Auto 009/2015, supra 62, at 7; see also Sentencia T-025/2004, supra
69, ¶ 7; see also Daniela Kravetz, Recent Developments in Colombian
Jurisprudence for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, INTLAWGRRLS (Apr. 15,
2015),
https://ilg2.org/2015/04/15/recent-developments-in-colombianjurisprudence-on-conflict-related-sexual-violence/ (noting that the Constitutional
Court has played a significant role in giving sexual violence crimes visibility).
72. See Situation in Colombia: Interim Report, supra note 70, ¶ 19 (reporting
that the Colombian Constitutional Court and United Nations Human Rights
Committee have noted the “inadequacy of prosecutorial and judicial activity in
relation to these crimes”); see also Statement by United Nations Special
Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict Zainab
Hawa Bangura: Breaking the Silence on Sexual Violence in Colombia (March 3,
2015) [hereinafter Breaking the Silence on Sexual Violence in Colombia]
(stressing that Colombian authorities must work to end the silence and impunity
surrounding sexual violence crimes).
73. See Working Group’s 2016 Report, supra note 70, at 76-79 (examining the
prioritization strategy adopted by the Office of the Attorney General in 2015
focused on the cases of conflict-related sexual violence); see also 2016 Sexual
Violence Protocol, supra note 67 (aiming at providing prosecution and
investigation staff with best practice guidelines in cases of sexual violence).
74. See Working Group’s 2016 Report, supra note 70, at 14 (noting that from
the 634 incidents of sexual violence referred to the Attorney General’s Office in
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progress has been made under the transitional justice framework
established by Law 975 of 2005 (known as the Justice and Peace
Law) to prosecute demobilized paramilitaries. 75 Several cases
prosecuted under this framework have resulted in convictions for
sexual and gender-based violence against former senior members of
the AUC. 76 These cases have highlighted the reasons why
paramilitaries engaged in sexual violence, the various categories of
victims, and its impact on local communities. 77
the Constitutional Court’s Orders 092 and 009, only 2,2% have resulted in
convictions); see also Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, ICC: OFFICE
OF THE PROSECUTOR, ¶ 154 (2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-PErep-2015-Eng.pdf (noting that “progress in the investigations and prosecutions of
cases in the ordinary justice system over the reporting period is limited”).
75. See L. 975/05, julio 25, 2005, 45.980 DIARO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.)
[hereinafter Justice and Peace Law].
76. The following cases prosecuted under the transitional justice framework of
Law 975 have resulted in convictions for crimes of sexual and gender-based
violence: Villa Zapata Judgment, supra note 60; Triana Mahecha Judgment, supra
note 67; Mancuso Judgment, supra note 69; Tribunal Superior de Bogotá [T. Sup.
Bogota] [Superior Tribunal of Bogotá], Sala de Justicia y Paz, septiembre 1, 2014,
11001-22-52000-2014-00019-00 (Colom.) [hereinafter Cifuentes Galindo
Judgment]; Tribunal Superior de Bogotá [T. Sup. Bogota] [Superior Tribunal of
Bogotá], Sala de Justicia y Paz, mayo 29, 2014, 11-001-60-00253-2007 (Colom.)
[hereinafter Isaza Arango Judgment]; Tribunal Superior de Bogotá [T. Sup.
Bogota] [Superior Tribunal of Bogotá], Sala de Justicia y Paz, diciembre 7, 2011,
110016000253-200681366 (Colom.) [hereinafter Fierro Flores Judgment]; Peña
Tobón Judgment, supra note 62. In other cases, evidence of sexual and genderbased violence has been considered to establish the contextual elements of war
crimes and crimes against humanity and the patterns of violence by paramilitary
groups. See Tribunal Superior de Medellin [T. Sup. Medellin] [Superior Tribunal
of Medellin], Sala de Justicia y Paz, abril 28, 2016, 110016000253200680068
(Colom.) [hereinafter Arroyo Ojeda Judgment]; see also Vanoy Murillo Judgment,
supra note 69, at ¶ 2510 (declaring gender-based violence as a pattern of
macrocriminality of the Bloque Mineros of the AUC). All judgments are available
here: http://www.fiscalia.gov.co/jyp/direccion-de-fiscalia-nacional-especializadade-justicia-transicional/ley_justicia_y_paz/ (last visited 15 July 2016).
77. See Mancuso Judgment, supra note 69, at ¶¶ 1290-96 (finding that the
AUC used different forms of sexual and gender-based violence as a war tactic to
gain control of territory, intimidate civilians, humiliate adversaries and destroy the
social fabric of communities). In the Villa Zapata et al case, the tribunal examined
the different forms of sexual and gender-based violence used by paramilitaries of
the Bloque Vencedores de Arauca to spread terror among the population. In some
instances, women who were suspected of having ties to left-wing guerilla groups
were tortured and brutally gang-raped by paramilitaries, and some were murdered
and dismembered after being raped. To explain why the victims had been targeted,
the tribunal examined the context of violence and discrimination against women
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In addition, the case against the notorious former paramilitary
leader Marco Tulio Pérez Guzmán (“El Oso”) has set an important
precedent in promoting accountability for sexual violence. 78 This
case focuses on crimes of sexual and gender-based violence against
Afro-Colombian women and girls perpetrated by paramilitaries from
2000 to 2004 in the Montes de María region, Colombia’s Caribbean
coast. 79 Under the transitional justice system, accused can benefit
from a reduced sentence (five to eight years) provided they
demobilize and fully disclose the truth about their crimes. 80 While
surrounding the crimes and concluded that the gender of the victims had influenced
the types of harm inflicted on them. Through this violence, paramilitaries sought to
both punish the women and humiliate the men of the opposing side. Villa Zapata
Judgment, supra note 60, at ¶¶ 881-904, 907-10, 913, 919-20, 924-28; see also
Villa Zapata Judgment, supra note 60, at ¶¶ 940-41; see also Vanoy Murillo
Judgment, supra note 69, at 1274-1331 (examining different forms of sexual and
gender-based violence perpetrated by the Bloque Mineros of the AUC against
women and girls); see also Vanoy Murillo Judgment, supra note 69, at 1300-1301
(referring to the murder of female community leaders because of their perceived
association with guerrilla groups); see also Vanoy Murillo Judgment, supra note
69, at 1306-1037 (indicating that local families provided their virgin daughters to
paramilitary commanders to show their loyalty and in exchange for protection).
78. See Marcelle Cohen, Sexual Violence: The Invisible, Mute, and Exempt
Crime Against Humanity, ROBERT S. STRAUSS CTR. (Aug. 4, 2015),
https://www.strausscenter.org/strauss-articles/sexual-violence-the-invisible-muteand-exempt-crime-against-humanity.html (highlighting that Pérez Guzmán’s
inability to admit his sexual abuse of women, despite admitting to systemic
murders and other crimes, resulted in the first time an ex-paramilitary leader lost
the benefits of the Justice and Peace Law for failing to acknowledge crimes of
sexual violence).
79. Pérez Guzmán (El Oso) is accused of regularly abducting women and girls
from a village under his group’s control and holding them for prolonged periods at
his military base, where he subjected them to repeated rapes, mistreatment and
forced labor. These crimes formed part of a broader context of violence by
paramilitaries against civilians in the region. Paramilitaries used different forms of
violence to obtain territorial control−including killings, abductions and torture−and
imposed exemplifying punishments based of the gender of the victims. In
particular, they used sexual violence as a means to punish women who “failed to
respect” the social rules they imposed. This violence became an expression of their
power over the women in the region. See Historical Memory Group 2011 Report,
supra note 64, at 158-69.
80. Law 905 of 2005 was adopted to facilitate the reintegration of members of
armed groups into civilian life, and contains provisions regarding the investigation,
prosecution and sentencing of members of armed groups who decide to
demobilize. The Constitutional Court issued several ruling interpreting the law. Its
ruling C-370 of 2006 is particularly significant as it held that the Law did not
design an effective incentive system for promoting full and accurate confessions
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initially tried under this system, Pérez Guzmán lost the benefits of
Law 975 for failing to tell the truth about the rapes he was charged
with, and his case was referred to an ordinary court for trial. 81 He
now faces up to 20 years in prison if found guilty.
On August 24, 2016, the government and the FARC signed a
peace agreement in Havana, Cuba, putting an end to the longest
running civil war. 82 The parties have agreed that there will be no
amnesty for serious international crimes, including for sexual
violence. However, the peace negotiations revealed complex tensions
between holding actors accountable for past war crimes and
advancing the peace process. For this peace to last, the parties need
to promote accountability of those most responsible for serious
international crimes−from both the FARC and the state− and need to
ensure that the full range of crimes are addressed, including crimes
of sexual violence. At the time of writing, the government and the
ELN have initiated peace discussions.

III. ADJUDICATING SEXUAL VIOLENCE AS AN
INTERNATIONAL CRIME AND ESTABLISHING
LIABILITY
Despite the prevailing impunity for sexual violence, efforts are
being made in each of the case study countries to prosecute these
crimes. In seeking accountability, legal practitioners have been
confronted with how to use their domestic legal framework to
by the accused, and required that to be eligible for benefits, demobilized fighters
had to provide complete and accurate confessions. See Corte Constitucional [C.C.]
[Constitutional Court], mayo 18, 2006, Sentencia C-370/06 (Colom.); see
generally Latin America Report N°49: Transitional Justice and Colombia’s Peace
Talks, INT’L CRISIS GROUP (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.crisisgroup.org/latinamerica-caribbean/andes/colombia/transitional-justice-and-colombia-s-peace-talks
(analyzing the implementation of Law 975 since its adoption).
81. See Recent Developments in Colombian Jurisprudence for ConflictRelated Sexual Violence, supra note 71 (citing the Barranquilla Tribunal ruling that
Pérez Guzmán would not benefit from the Justice and Peace Law because “the
accused must fully disclose the truth about their crimes”).
82. See generally Excerpts from the August 24 Announcement of a Final Peace
Accord between the Government and the FARC, WOLA (Aug. 25, 2016),
http://colombiapeace.org; see also Nicholas Casey, Colombia and FARC Reach
Deal to End the Americas’ Longest War, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/25/world/americas/colombia-farc-peacedeal.html.
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accurately characterize sexual violence as an international crime.
This has been a complex exercise. It has required finding a coherent
balance between advocating for progressive interpretations of
domestic criminal provisions without sidestepping the principle of
legality. It has also required understanding how international law can
be used to support charges of sexual violence and to reflect the
varied manifestations of sexual violence in conflict. The adjudication
of sexual violence as an international crime in the cases discussed
below has served to reflect the gravity of the criminal conduct and to
acknowledge the harm caused to the victims. These cases have also
challenged the misconception that sexual violence is an incidental
by-product of armed conflict and of less gravity than other
violations.
Establishing liability for sexual violence has also posed significant
challenges and obstacles. While the tendency in the case study
countries has been to pursue physical perpetrators, progress has been
made in recent years in holding senior officials accountable for
sexual violence. In cases against senior-level leaders who were not
physical perpetrators or present at the scene of the crimes,
practitioners have had to focus on linking the crimes to the accused.
This has required choosing the appropriate mode of liability and
obtaining evidence to connect the conduct of the accused to the
sexual violence. These cases have demonstrated the connections
between sexual violence and the objectives of criminal campaigns
unleashed by armed groups, and have highlighted the role sexual
violence played in these campaigns. These cases have also helped
overcome the misconception that only physical perpetrators can be
held accountable for sexual violence.

A. USING INTERNATIONAL LAW TO INTERPRET AND APPLY
CRIMINAL PROVISIONS IN GUATEMALA
In Guatemala, the Criminal Code contains a provision to prosecute
war crimes and crimes against humanity, Article 378, entitled
“Crimes against the Duties of Humanity”. 83 This article is an open
83. CÓDIGO PENAL (Criminal Code) art. 378 (Guat.) [hereinafter Guatemalan
Crim. Code] (“Crimes against the Duties of Humanity: Whosoever violates or
infringes humanitarian obligations, laws or covenants regarding prisoners or
hostages of war or those wounded in battle, or whosoever commits any inhuman
act against the civilian population or against hospitals or places designated for the
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provision in that it does not describe in detail the conduct proscribed,
but makes reference to sources of international law. This provision
has been interpreted as allowing courts to adjudicate acts constituting
war crimes or crimes against humanity under customary or
conventional international law binding on Guatemala. 84
In the aforementioned Sepur Zarco case, Article 378 was used to
bring charges of sexual violence. During the pre-trial phase, the
prosecution and the civil parties relied on Article 378 to argue that
conduct amounting to rape, sexual and domestic enslavement, and
cruel and degrading treatment was recognized as crimes against
humanity under customary international law when the crimes were
committed, and that this provision allows a court to define the
proscribed conduct by reference to international law binding on
Guatemala. During the stage of proceedings intended to determine
whether there is a basis for committing a person to trial, the First
Instance Judge permitted the case to go to trial on the basis of these
specific charges. He reasoned, in part, that Article 378 is a “blank
penal law,” 85 and that while it does not describe the conduct in detail,
there was nothing barring its application to these crimes. 86
In its decision issued on February 26, 2016, the High Risk
Tribunal “A” convicted both accused−Reyes Girón and Valdez
Asig−for the crimes charged under Article 378. The Tribunal found
that in 1982, the army attacked the community of Sepur Zarco,
killing or forcibly disappearing a group of male Mayan Q’eqchi’
leaders who had taken steps to obtain recognition of their land
rights. 87 Other men were detained and severely mistreated. 88 The
wounded[,] will be sentenced from 20-30 years in prison.”).
84. See Monitoreo de la Justicia Transicional en Guatemala, Tomo II:
Derecho a la justicia para las víctimas del Conflicto Armado Interno, IMPUNITY
WATCH, 16-18, 20-21, 63 (2014), http://www.impunitywatch.org/docs/Research_
report_informe_monitoreo_IW_JUSTICIA_Dec_2014.pdf.
85. Juzgado Primero de Primera Instancia Penal Oct. 14, 2014, Narcoactividad
y Delitos contra el Ambiente por Procesos de Mayor Riesgo [First Tribunal for
Crime, Drug Trafficking and Environmental Offences] Oct. 14, 2014, Expediente
No. C-01076-2012-00021, Resolución de Fase Intermedia (Guat.).
86. See Rios Montt Judgment, supra note 27, at 707 (showing a consistent
interpretation of the law). At the time of writing, legislative reform is underway in
Guatemala to implement the Rome Statute domestically.
87. See Sepur Zarco Judgment, supra note 36, at 126, 128-30,198-200, 20911, 214-15, 218-19, 223, 235, 239-40, 260-61, 264, 267-68, 273, 292, 474
(describing, among other things, that local landowners felt threatened by these
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women in the community suffered a different fate. The army burned
down their homes and their belongings. 89 They also raped the women
during the attack against the community. 90 One woman was
repeatedly raped in front of her two young daughters, and was
subsequently killed along with her daughters. 91 In the absence of
their husbands, the soldiers considered the women to be at their
disposal, and they forced the women to take turns washing, cooking
and cleaning for them at the Sepur Zarco military base, giving them
no financial compensation. 92 They also subjected the women to
repeated sexual violence at the base. 93 The women were also raped in
their homes, sometimes in front of their children, and by the river
when they went to wash clothes. 94 Several families sought refuge in
the mountains, and suffered from malnutrition and starvation. 95
These abuses continued for six years, until the soldiers withdrew
from Sepur Zarco. 96 As a result of this violence, the women suffered
demands and had called upon the army to suppress them).
88. See id. at 345-54.
89. See id. at 219-20, 225, 230, 233, 235, 239-40, 255-56.
90. See id. at 485; see also Elisabeth Patterson, The Sepur Zarco Trial from an
Indigenous Law Perspective, AVOCAT SANS FRONTIERS (Apr. 27, 2016),
http://www.asfcanada.ca/fr/blogue/billet/the-sepur-zarco-trial-from-an-indigenouslaw-perspective/317 (describing how the victims expressed themselves in
Q’eqchi’, and how the issue of translation was particularly important during trial
because the victims often used euphemisms to speak about the rapes, such as the
term “Barz’unleek” which, taken literally, translates as “they played with me,” but
in fact means “they raped me”).
91. Sepur Zarco Judgment, supra note 36, at 200-01, 205, 283-86, 352, 48283.
92. See id. at 200, 206, 259, 279.
93. See id., at 205, 211, 216, 220-21, 240, 259, 479 (recounting several
women’s encounters when they went to the base to cook every three days and,
each time, different soldiers raped them and other women at gunpoint).
94. See id. at 200, 207, 209, 220-21, 224, 230, 235, 255, 265-66, 269, 271,
273, 478; see also Jo-Marie Burt, Victim Witnesses Tell of Atrocites at Sepur
Zarco, INT’L JUST. MONITOR (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.ijmonitor.org/
2016/02/victim-witnesses-tell-of-atrocities-at-sepur-zarco/
(describing
one
woman’s experience that soldiers would often pass by her house and rape her,
saying that “‘[t]he [soldiers] told me if I didn’t let them [rape me] they would kill
me,’ she said. ‘Sometimes they tied me down and put a rifle on my chest. . . . They
knew which ones of us [women] were alone. . . . They treated us like animals, . . .
It was so painful. They did this to me because I was alone’”); see also Sepur Zarco
Judgment, supra note 36, at 211-13.
95. See Sepur Zarco Judgment, supra note 36, at 270-73, 275, 480.
96. See id. at 206, 256-57.
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serious physical and psychological harm. 97 They also suffered
cultural harm, seeing their lives within the community destroyed. 98
The Tribunal held that the Guatemalan army perpetrated these crimes
against Mayan Q’eqchi’ women as a means of exercising control and
power over the community. 99 It also acknowledged the victims’
courage in testifying publicly about their experiences and in breaking
the silence about these crimes. 100
Two evidentiary issues in relation to this case are worth
highlighting. First, to minimize the trauma for the victims, the
tribunal allowed the prosecution and the civil parties to introduce the
testimonies of the victims at trial using pre-recorded videos in lieu of
oral testimony (called anticipatory evidence under Guatemalan law),
and it found this evidence to be reliable and internally consistent. 101
One of the victims died before the start of the trial, and the tribunal
admitted her pre-recorded testimony, finding it reliable. 102 Second,
the parties adduced a range of other sources of evidence to prove the
charges, including testimonial, forensic and documentary
evidence. 103 In particular, the prosecution and the civil parties called
97. See id. at 200, 207, 256, 273 (describing the psychological repercussions
of violence against women).
98. See id. at 476-77; see also Patterson, supra note 90 (noting that the victims
have been unable to remarry or recover their plot of land, and have “often had to
live with their mother, beg to survive, or work for other members of the
community as servants”).
99. See Sepur Zarco Judgment, supra note 36, at 473.
100. See id. at 489 (“it is necessary to emphasize that we, the judges, have
observed that the women victims broke down during their testimonies, expressing
their pain, suffering, solitude and helplessness, not only because of what occurred
to them at that time, but also because of their powerlessness before armed men
who changed the course of their lives, without caring about the consequences of
their actions”) (unofficial translation).
101. See Victim Witnesses Tell of Atrocities at Sepur Zarco, supra note 94
(explaining that the testimonies were videotaped at preliminary evidentiary
hearings in 2012, at which time the accused were represented by public defenders,
and the videotaped testimonies were accepted as evidence in this manner due to the
advanced age of the victims and in an attempt to prevent their re-traumatization);
see also Sepur Zarco Judgment, supra note 36, at 263, 272, 275, 471, 485.
102. See Victim Witnesses Tell of Atrocities at Sepur Zarco, supra note 94; see
also Sepur Zarco Judgment, supra note 36, at 260-64.
103. See Sepur Zarco Judgment, supra note 36, at 420-23, 433-72 (including
evidence of military plans designed by the Guatemalan army that formed the
framework of its counterinsurgency campaign and set out the measures of control
to be implemented vis-à-vis the Mayan population); see also Sepur Zarco
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more than a dozen expert witnesses. 104 Among other issues, the court
relied on this expert testimony in relation to: the elements of the
crimes charged under international law; the assessment of the
credibility of victims of gross human rights abuses; the broader
context of violence in which the crimes of sexual violence occurred;
the impact of the crimes on the victims and their community; and the
military and political structures in place during the relevant period. 105
These expert witnesses provided the judges with the contextual
evidence necessary to find that the crimes charged fell within the
scope of Article 378.

B. USING INTERNATIONAL LAW TO ADDRESS PAST CRIMES IN PERU
As in Guatemala, Peruvian criminal law does not explicitly
recognize sexual violence as an international crime. Two different
criminal codes are applied in Peru in cases of serious human rights
abuses, the 1924 and the 1991 Codes. Their application depends on
the period of commission of the crimes. While different forms of
sexual violence are listed as ordinary crimes in both, neither code
recognizes these crimes as international crimes. The 1991 Code
contains crimes against humanity provisions regarding other
categories of crimes of non-sexual nature. 106 The lack of a proper
legal framework makes it more difficult to address past crimes of
sexual violence; if charged as ordinary crimes, these crimes can be
subject to the statute of limitations.107 In addition, charging conflictrelated sexual violence as an ordinary crime fails to take into account
the broader context of violence in which it occurred.
Given the absence of clear provisions, practitioners have been
Judgment, supra note 36, at 405-06.
104. See id., at 417-18. The approach of leading extensive expert evidence was
also followed in the Ríos Montt case.
105. See id. at 473-77.
106. See Peru 1991 Crim. Code. arts. 319-24 (recognizing the following crimes
as crimes against humanity: genocide, torture, enforced disappearance,
discrimination and genetic manipulation); compare 1924 Peru Crim. Code art. 194
(containing more restrictive provisions to prosecute sexual violence, such as the
limiting the definition of the crime of rape to be gender-specific, requiring the
victim to be female) with Peru 1991 Crim. Code art. 170 (providing a genderneutral definition of rape as to the perpetrator and the victim). This difference can
have implications as to the crimes charged under each code.
107. See Mantilla Falcón, supra note 44, at 44.
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confronted with how to charge past crimes as international crimes
without violating the principle of legality. 108 They have tried to
overcome this hurdle by arguing for an “adapted” principle of
legality grounded on the Peruvian Constitutional Court’s
interpretation of the primacy of international human rights treaties
over domestic law. 109 Concretely, practitioners have argued that
crimes of sexual violence can be prosecuted as international crimes
before Peruvian courts provided that the charges are grounded in
international law binding on Peru and that the required contextual
elements for international crimes are met. In practice, prosecutors
charge the criminal conduct under domestic criminal provisions−for
example as rape−while characterizing the act as a crime against
108. The issue of the legal characterization of human rights violations as crimes
against humanity was raised in relation to the massacres committed by a
paramilitary death squad known as the Colina group in Lima’s Barrios Altos
district and at La Cantuta University in the early 1990s. The jurisprudence in
relation to these events has been relied upon in subsequent cases where crimes
have been charged as crimes against humanity. In 2009, the Special Criminal
Chamber of the Supreme Court sentenced former President Alberto Fujimori to 25
years for these massacres. It held that while these crimes were characterized as
aggravated murder and grievous bodily harm under domestic law, they amounted
to crimes against humanity under international customary law. See Sala Penal
Especial de la Corte Suprema [S.P.E.C.S.] [Special Criminal Chamber of the
Supreme Court], abril 7, 2009, “Fujimori, Alberto c. Borja, Luis Antonio León,”
Rol de la causa: AV 19-2001, ¶¶ 711, 714, 717 (Peru) [hereinafter Fujimori
Judgment]. However, in 2012, in a related case against Vladimiro Montesinos, the
former head of national intelligence, and other members of the Colina group, the
Permanent Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court held that the Barrios Altos and
La Cantuta massacres did not amount to crimes against humanity, among other
reasons, because the actions of the Colina group targeted terrorists and not
civilians. Human rights advocates brought the case before the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights, which found that the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision
departed from prior jurisprudence that had characterized these crimes as crimes
against humanity. It also found that the 2012 Supreme Court’s decision violated
the rights of the victims and their families to truth, justice and reparation. The
Supreme Court eventually overturned its 2012 ruling, finding that these crimes
amounted to crimes against humanity. See Barrios Altos v. Peru, Monitoring
Compliance with Judgment, Judgment, ¶¶ 32-48, 58-63 (Sept. 7, 2012),
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/barrios_07_09_12.pdf.
109. Tribunal Constitucional [T.C.] [Constitutional Court], abril 25, 2006,
“Colegio de Abogados de Arequipa c. el artículo 22, inciso c), de la Ley N.º
26397, Orgánica del Consejo Nacional de la Magistratura,” Rol de la causa: 00252005- PI/TC y 0026-2005- PI/TC, constitucional, ¶¶ 25-34 (Peru) (holding that
international human rights treaties binding on Peru form part of the internal legal
framework).
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humanity by arguing that the contextual elements are met. An
alternative approach has been to charge sexual violence as torture,
which has been recognized as a crime against humanity under
domestic law since 1998. 110 This legal characterization of sexual
violence as an international crime results in the inapplicability of the
statute of limitations.111
In an emblematic case concerning the Manta and Vilca military
bases, crimes of sexual violence are being pursued as crimes against
humanity. 112 This case involves two military bases established in
neighboring communities in the rural highland province of
Huencavelica between 1984 and 1995. 113 Members of the army at
110. Legal practitioners have taken different approaches to characterizing
sexual violence as torture. For example, in one ruling from 2007, the
Supraprovincial Criminal Prosecution Office of Huencavelica, characterized acts
of sexual violence as torture and declared the non-applicability of the statute of
limitations. See Mantilla Falcón, supra note 44, at 44. However, in another case
dealing with abuses at the Manta and Vilca military bases between 1984 and 1988,
a provincial judge held that the rapes could not be characterized as torture, contrary
to what the prosecution and the civil parties had argued. While recognizing that the
statute of limitations does not apply to serious violations of human rights, the judge
found that the crime of torture could not be charged in this case because it had only
been incorporated into the Criminal Code in 1998, after the facts in the case took
place. The judge retained the charges of rape as ordinary crimes and characterized
them as crimes against humanity, relying on international law. See Segundo
Tribunal Supraprovincial Penal [S.T.S.P.] [Second Supraprovincial Criminal
Tribunal], noviembre 9, 2009, “Sabino Valentin Rutti,” Rol de la causa: 201000312- 10, Auto de apertura de instrucción, 8-10, 15-17 (Peru).
111. See Fujimori Judgment, supra note 108, at ¶¶ 711-16 (holding that under
international customary law, crimes that occur in the context of a widespread or
systematic attack against the civilian population are not subject to a statute of
limitations); see also Barrios Altos v. Peru, Monitoring Compliance with
Judgment, Judgment, ¶ 41 (Aug. 4, 2008), http://corteidh.or.cr/
docs/supervisiones/barrios_04_08_08_ing.pdf (holding that all amnesty provisions,
provisions on prescription and the establishment of measures designed to eliminate
responsibility are inadmissible, because they are intended to prevent the
investigation and punishment of those responsible for serious human rights
violations).
112. René Zubieta Pacco, Violaciones en Manta y Vilca: juicio a militares
inicia mañana, El Comercio (July 7, 2016), http://elcomercio.pe/sociedad/
huancavelica/violaciones-manta-y-vilca-juicio-militares-inicia-manana-noticia1915125. Cf. BOESTEN, supra note 4, at 118 (noting the numerous delays in the
prosecutor’s investigation into these events).
113. BOESTEN, supra note 4, at 117. At the time of the events, the districts of
Manta and Vilca were small, rural communities with no running water, sewage, or
electricity. See generally Mercedes Crisóstomo Meza, Mujeres y Fuerzas Armadas
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these bases are accused of systematic crimes of sexual violence
against the population, as well as of other gross human rights
abuses. 114 Many women were raped by soldiers in the bases, in their
houses, and even in public spaces. 115 In its Final Report, the CVR
identified twenty-four victims of sexual violence, and concluded that,
“sexual violence was a persistent and daily practice in the region of
Manta and Vilca, perpetrated primarily by the army from military
bases in the area”. 116 Prosecutors and the civil parties have argued
that these crimes amount to crimes against humanity because they
were committed in the context of widespread and systematic human
rights abuses against the Manta and Vilca communities. 117 Despite
numerous delays, the trial against members of the Peruvian military
for these crimes began in July 2016. 118 A conviction regarding these
events would mark an important precedent in recognizing sexual
violence as a crime against humanity in Peru.
en un Contexto de Violencia Política: Los Casos de Manta y Vilca en
Huancavelica 6-43 (Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Working Paper No. 210, 2015).
114. Cuarto Juzgado Penal Supraprovicinal de Lima [Fourth Supraprovincial
Criminal Tribunal of Lima], 2009, Auto apertorio de instrucción del caso de las
mujeres violadas en las comunidades de Manta y Vilca, ¶ 11.
115. See BOESTEN, supra note 4, at 117 (describing the perpetrators crimes).
116. CVR Final Report, supra note 11, Vol. VIII, Part II, Ch. 2.1, 86
(characterizing these acts as both rape and torture and noting that sexual violence
constituted a pattern of action by military personnel in the area, who took
advantage of their power to commit these crimes). Many of the victims were
suspected of being senderistas, and in some cases the soldiers raped them to
extract information from them, or to intimidate them; CVR Final Report, supra
note 11, Vol. VIII, Part II, Ch. 2.1, 65, 86.
117. See Carlos Rivera Paz, Fiscalía presentó acusación en caso Manta y Vilca
(March
12,
2015),
http://www.justiciaviva.org.pe/notihome/notihome
01.php?noti=1572 (describing the challenges faced in investigating this case); see
also CVR Final Report, supra note 11, Vol. VIII, Part. II, Ch. 2.1, 99
(documenting the context in which the rapes took place within the broader context
of sexual violence against women during the conflict).
118. Fernando Alayo Orbegozo, Manta y Vilca: Fiscalía pide que jucio sea por
lesa humanidad, El Comercio (July 9, 2016), http://elcomercio.pe/
sociedad/peru/manta-y-vilca-fiscalia-pide-que-juicio-sea-lesa-humanidad-noticia1915594; Cristina Valega Chipoco & Julio Rodriguez Vasquez, Violaciones
sexuales en Manta de 20 años de impunidad?, ENFOQUE DERECHO (June 16,
2016), http://enfoquederecho.com/penal/violaciones-sexuales-en-manta-y-vilca-elfin-de-mas-de-20-anos-de-impunidad/; see BOESTEN, supra note 4, at 117-18
(noting some major reasons why the prosecution fails to bring charges in so many
instances of sexual violence); see generally Mantilla Falcón, supra note 44, at 45
(providing procedural background of the case).
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Two further emblematic cases could also set important precedents:
the Chumbivilcas and the Los Cabitos cases. In both cases,
prosecutors and the civil parties have argued that the crimes amount
to crimes against humanity, and both are currently in the trial phase.
The Chumbivilcas case concerns crimes perpetrated by a military
patrol that went into various communities in the province of
Chumbivilcas, Cuzco department, searching for “subversive
elements” during a ten-day period in April 1990. 119 During this
period, members of the military patrol perpetrated widespread abuses
against civilians, including extrajudicial killings, torture and
enforced disappearances. 120 The soldiers also raped some of the
women in these communities. 121 The prosecution has argued that the
pattern of human rights abuses perpetrated by the military, the
number of victims, and the tactics employed in the context of its
counterinsurgency campaign amount to a widespread and systematic
attack on the civilian population, and that the crimes should therefore
be characterized as crimes against humanity. 122
The crimes in the Los Cabitos case were perpetrated in Andean
Peru at the military base Los Cabitos, located in Huamanga,
Ayacucho Deparment. 123 The base functioned as a detention and
torture center for those suspected of belonging to subversive groups,
as well as a site for extrajudicial killings. 124 The accused in the case
include former senior members of the Peruvian military. 125 In 2003,
the CVR documented 138 cases of torture, enforced disappearance
and killings between 1983 and 1985 at Los Cabitos, but further
119. See CVR Final Report, supra note 11, Vol. VII, Ch. 2.42.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. Segunda Fiscalía Superior Penal Nacional [Second Superior National
Public Prosecution], Jaime Manuel Pando Navarrete y otros por delitos contra la
humanidad en la modalidad Desaparición Forzada y otros, Exp. No. 037-2008,
Dictamen N. 07-2014-2°FSPN-MP/FN, March 5, 2013, 7-8.
123. See BOESTEN, supra note 4, at 109-10 (detailing the gross atrocities that
occurred at the military base).
124. See CVR Final Report, supra note 11, Vol. VII, Ch. 2.9.
125. This case was initially investigated in the 90s, but later shelved. A report
from the Inter-American Commission regarding this case prompted authorities to
reopen the investigation in 1996, only to later close it. A probe into these events
was finally re-launched after the publication of the CVR’s Final Report in 2003.
See CVR Final Report, supra note 11, Vol. VII, Ch. 2.9; see also IACHR Report,
supra note 119 (discussing the petitioner’s position on the issues).
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victims have been identified since. 126 Human rights organizations
have brought forward evidence of sexual violence against women at
the base. 127 The trial in this case is currently underway, although
proceeding slowly. 128
While these developments are promising, the Peruvian judiciary
has yet to adjudicate sexual violence as a crime against humanity. A
challenge prosecutors are facing is to convince judges that sexual
violence formed part of the broader context of human rights abuses
perpetrated against the civilian population during the conflict. For
example, in the 2015 Vallejo Cortéz case, the accused was acquitted
of the sexual violence charge because the judges failed to properly
apply the contextual elements for crimes against humanity. Vallejo
Cortéz, then a military captain, was charged with committing the
crimes of murder, attempted murder, torture and rape as crimes
against humanity against villagers in the province of Vilcashuamán,
Ayacucho, in May 1989. 129 Among other crimes, he was accused of
raping a female villager in her home while he searched for
subversive material. 130 During his trial, Vallejo Cortéz pled guilty to
126. CVR Final Report, supra note 11, Vol. VII, Ch. 2.9; BOESTEN, supra note
4, at 109-10 (noting that forensic scientists have identified the bones of 109 people,
though some people estimate around 300 people were killed).
127. The sexual violence evidence has been heard in support of the overall
pattern of crimes against humanity. E.g., Gloria Cano et al., Cuartel Los Cabitos:
Lugar de Horror y Muerte (D & L Publicaciones E.I.R.L. 2014) (expanding on the
details of the case); see Caso Cabitos, Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos,
http://www.aprodeh.org.pe/index.php/casos-judicializados/ayacucho/86-prueba-dearticulo-en-caso-ayacucho (last updated Oct. 5, 2016) (providing a case summary).
128. Several of the accused, as well as several family members of the victims,
have died during the course of the trial proceedings. See, e.g., Marie Castillo, Solo
quedan 5 procesados en el caso Los Cabitos, LA REPUBLICA (June 29, 2015),
http://larepublica.pe/impresa/politica/11409-solo-quedan-5-procesados-en-el-casolos-cabitos; see Jo-Marie Burt & María Rodríguez, Juicio por el Caso Los Cabitos.
Crónicas de las audiencias en Ayacucho (Partes 1 & 2), ASUNTOS DEL SUR BLOG
(Aug. 27-28, 2012), http://asuntos.sudwebs.com/blog/tag/jo-marie-burt/ (giving
details about the trial).
129. See Sala Penal Nacional [National Criminal Chamber], Cesar Augusto
Vallejo Cortez, Penal No. 49-2013, Sentencia, enero 27, 2015 [hereinafter Vallejo
Cortez Judgment].
130. According to the prosecution, Vallejo Cortéz, together with several
subordinates, had been drinking at a local establishment in the village, outside their
military base. After some hours, Vallejo Cortéz entered the private home of the
owner of the establishment, claiming to search the home for material supporting
subversive groups, and raped her. To cover up his crime, he accused her of being a
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all charges. In its 25-page sentencing judgment, the judges found the
accused guilty of all charges, except the rape. 131 While finding that
the crimes occurred in the context of serious human rights abuses by
the military against the civilian population, the judges found that the
rape−unlike the other crimes−was an isolated incident and was not
perpetrated pursuant to “systematic orders” from the military, nor in
the context of a coordinated military operation. 132 The judges
concluded that the rape amounted to an ordinary crime and that
therefore the statute of limitations for such crimes applied. 133 An
appeal in this case is pending.
Finally, the Peruvian judiciary has not yet addressed other forms
of state-sponsored gender-based violence. One example is the mass
forced sterilizations program implemented during the Fujimori
regime in the 1990s, in which over 200,000 women and 20,000
men−mostly from poor and indigenous backgrounds−were sterilized
without their informed consent. 134 Over the years, women’s rights
senderista, and burned down her store. He also ordered his soldiers to open fire on
some villagers celebrating a birthday in a neighboring house, also accusing them of
being senderistas. Several villagers were killed and others injured in this incident.
Vallejo Cortéz later reported to his superiors that the Shining Path had perpetrated
these crimes. According to the prosecution, to further cover up the crimes, the
military later arrested several relatives of the deceased and tortured them, forcing
them to sign statements that members of the Shining Path were responsible for the
crimes. They also arrested the rape victim and took her to their military base,
where they raped her in a bid to silence her. See id. at 4-7.
131. See id. at 18 (noting the accused was also acquitted of the charge of abuse
of authority).
132. Id. at 19. The reasoning followed by the judges in dismissing the sexual
violence charge in this case is not consistent with international criminal law. To
amount to a crime against humanity, it is not the sexual violence per se that must
be shown to be widespread or systematic, but rather the attack of which the sexual
violence formed part. See Gacumbitsi v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-A,
Appeals Judgment by Judges Shahabuddeen, Guney, Daqun, Meron and
Schomburg, ¶ 102 (July 7, 2006); see Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-9623 & 23/1-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 96 (June 12, 2002).
133. See Vallejo Cortez Judgment, supra 130, at 23.
134. See ALEJANDRA BALLÓN, MEMORIAS DEL CASO PERUANO DE
ESTERLIZACIÓN
FORZADA
32-34
(Alejandra
Ballón
ed.
2014),
http://bvirtual.bnp.gob.pe/bnp/faces/pdf/esterilizacionforzada/index.html#34
(arguing that the implementation of the state run sterilization program had a
distinct gendered impact because it targeted a significantly higher percentage of
females); see also Javier Lizarzaburu, Forced sterilization haunts Peruvian women
decades on, BBC NEWS (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world
latinamerica34855804 (detailing the timeline of events that led to the investigation
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groups have repeatedly called for these crimes to be investigated and
prosecuted as crimes against humanity and as genocide, and for
Fujimori and his former health ministers to be held accountable for
these crimes. In 2014, the Public Prosecution Office closed a pending
investigation into these crimes, allegedly due to lack of evidence.
The civil parties later filed a complaint against this decision, forcing
the Public Prosecution to reopen its investigation. 135 However, in late
July 2016, the public prosecutor in charge of the case ruled that
Fujimori and his former health ministers would not face charges for
their state-run sterilization program, closing the case. The prosecutor
indicated that individual medical personnel was responsible for the
“isolated” cases of sterilization and recommended that several
doctors be charged. 136 The civil parties have filed an appeal against
this decision before the Public Prosecution Office.

C. USING INTERNATIONAL LAW TO PROSECUTE SEXUAL VIOLENCE
AS A WAR CRIME AND AS A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY IN
COLOMBIA

In Colombia, crimes of sexual violence have been recognized as
war crimes and crimes against humanity under different legal
regimes. The Colombian Criminal Code (Law 599 of 2000)
expressly lists crimes of sexual violence as war crimes. 137 In
addition, Law 1719 of 2014 on Access to Justice for Victims of
Sexual Violence−a law aimed at reducing impunity for sexual
of the sterilizations).
135. See José A. Burneo Labrín, Esterilización Forzada en el Perú: Delito de
Lesa Humanidad, Estudio para la Defensa de los Derechos de la Mujer, DEMUS
(2008), https://1996pnsrpf2000.files.wordpress.com/2011/07/demus-esterilizacic
3b3n-forzada-en-el-perc3ba-delito-de-lesa-humanidad.pdf; see also Peru Reopens
Criminal Investigation Into Mass Forced Sterilizations, CENTER FOR
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS (May 13, 2015), http://www.reproductiverights.org/pressroom/peru-reopens-criminal-investigation-into-mass-forced-sterilizations; see also
Mestanza Chávez v Peru, Case 12.181, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No.
71/03, OEA/Ser.L., Friendly Settlement (2003), http://www.cidh.oas.org/
annualrep/2003 eng/Peru.12191.htm.
136. Dan Collyns, Women vow to fight on in Peru after Alberto Fujimori
absolved over forced sterilisations, GUARDIAN (Aug. 3, 2016), https://www.the
guardian.com/global-development/2016/aug/03/women-vow-to-fight-on-in-peruafter-fujimori-absolved-over-forced-sterilisations?CMP=twt_gu.
137. 599 C. PEN. titulo II (2000); see De las Normas Rectoras de la Ley Penal
Colombiana, 100 C. PEN. art. 1 (1980) (citing to law that was in force before the
adoption of the 2000 Criminal Code).
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violence and at guaranteeing the rights of victims−expanded these
war crime provisions to include a fuller list of sexual violence
crimes. 138 However, the recognition of sexual violence as a crime
against humanity has been recent and controversial, and has required
a flexible interpretation of the Criminal Code, as this Code does not
contain a provision on crimes against humanity. 139 An important
amendment introduced by Law 1719 in this respect was the
requirement that judges declare that sexual violence amounts to a
crime against humanity in their cases when the contextual elements
of these crimes are met. 140 For this purpose, these contextual
elements are interpreted in accordance with the Rome Statute. 141
Arguably, this imposes an implicit duty on prosecutors to charge
sexual violence as a crime against humanity when the elements for
these crimes are satisfied. 142 This does not mean that Law 1719
incorporated crimes against humanity into the Criminal Code, nor
that an accused person can be convicted for crimes against humanity.
Rather, it means that prosecutors must charge crimes under the
individual war crimes categories in the Criminal Code and can
request that the judge declare that those crimes also amount to crimes
against humanity. Colombian courts have accepted this practice and
have held that a sexual violence crime perpetrated in the context of
138. See L. 1719 arts. 2-10, junio 18, 2014, 49 Diario Oficial [D.O.] (Colom.)
(introducing the following war crimes: abusive rape on minors under the age of 14;
sexual acts with minors under the age of 14; sexual slavery; forced prostitution;
trafficking for sexual exploitation; forced sterilization; forced pregnancy; and
forced nudity).
139. However, in different sections, the Criminal Code lists certain categories
of crimes recognized as crimes against humanity in Article 7 of the Rome Statute,
such torture (article 178), murder (article 103), enforced disappearance (article
165), and forced displacement (article 180). None of these provisions require that
the crimes must take place in the context of a widespread or systematic attack
against a civilian population. See Delitos contra Personas y Bienes Protegidos por
el Derecho Internacional Humanitario, 599 C. PEN. arts. 103, 165, 178, 180 (2000).
But see Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7, July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (recognizing specific crimes as
crimes against humanity).
140. See L. 1719, art. 15.
141. See id.
142. Compare L. 1719, art. 15 (stating that prosecutors must prove that the acts
were committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any
civilian population, with knowledge of the attack), with Rome Statute, art. 7(2)(a)
(requiring the attack to be carried out “pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or
organizational policy”).

KRAVETZ- FINAL PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

PROMOTING DOMESTIC ACCOUNTABILITY

2/23/2017 12:40 PM

743

the conflict can amount to both a war crime and a crime against
humanity. 143
To prove that an act of sexual violence amounts to a war crime,
Colombian prosecutors must demonstrate that the act of sexual
violence was committed against a protected person under
international humanitarian law and that it was closely related to the
armed conflict. 144 To establish the protected status of victims,
prosecutors are required to show that the victims were civilians or
persons not taking an active part in the hostilities. 145 Given that
sexual violence is prohibited in any circumstance, the Attorney
General’s Office has acknowledged its duty to investigate cases of
sexual violence against any individual, regardless of their status. 146
This is significant because different armed groups have been accused
of perpetrating sexual violence against female combatants and child
soldiers within their ranks. 147
To meet the conflict nexus requirement, prosecutors have had to
143. See Villa Zapata Judgment, supra note 60, ¶¶ 754-58; see also Mancuso
Judgment, supra note 69, ¶¶ 1316-20; see also Peña Tobón Judgment, supra note
62, ¶¶ 82-103.
144. Prosecutors are not required to prove that the accused had knowledge of
this connection, which is a legal requirement under international criminal law.
Proving the existence of an armed conflict is straightforward, as the Supreme
Court has declared it a fact of common knowledge. See 2016 Sexual Violence
Protocol, supra note 67, ¶ 218.
145. See C. PEN. 2000, art. 135 (stating that the category of “protected persons”
includes civilians, persons not taking active part in the hostilities, civilians in the
power of the opposing side, persons hors de combat, as well as other persons
recognized as such in the 1949 IV Geneva Convention and in the 1977 Additional
Protocols I and II); see also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), of 8 June 1977 art. 4, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II] (providing fundamental guarantees for
persons not taking an active part in the hostilities); see also Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949,
75 U.N.T.S. 135 (defining “protected person”); see generally 2016 Sexual
Violence Protocol, supra note 67, ¶¶ 221-23.
146. In this respect, the Attorney General’s Office has recognized that sexual
violence is prohibited in all circumstances in armed conflict, regardless of the
status of the victims. See Sexual Violence Protocol, supra note 67, ¶ 223; see also
Arroyo Ojeda Judgment, supra note 76, 567 (indicating that, on the basis of the
evidence, the prosecution should have charged the rape of a girl child soldier by a
member of her own armed group).
147. See Luis Andrés Fajardo Arturo & Rosa Yineth Valoyes Valoyes,
Violencia Sexual como Crímen Internacional Perpetrado por las FARC 18 (2015).
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accurately contextualize the crimes and make the connection
between the crime and the broader context of violence in which it
took place. The Niño Balaguera et al case illustrates the importance
of viewing the crimes in context. 148 The case concerned two former
members of the paramilitary group known as the Black Eagles. They
were accused of abducting, raping and torturing a woman, after
murdering members of her family. In its November 2014 decision on
appeal, the Supreme Court’s Criminal Chamber overturned a ruling
from a lower court that had failed to find that the crimes amounted to
war crimes. 149 The Chamber examined the broader context of
violence in which the crimes occurred to establish the conflict nexus
requirement. Following the jurisprudence of the ad hoc international
criminal tribunals, the Chamber found that the armed conflict played
a substantial part in the perpetrators’ ability to commit the crimes, 150
in their decision to commit the crimes, 151 in the manner in which
these were perpetrated 152 and in the purpose of the violence. 153 It
concluded that the prosecution had correctly charged the crimes as
war crimes, and convicted both accused for these crimes, increasing
their sentences.
To establish the contextual elements for both war crimes and
crimes against humanity, prosecutors have focused on cases in which
they are able to demonstrate the existence of a pattern of violence
148. Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala de Casación
Penal, noviembre 12, 2014, M.P: F. Caballero, Radicación No. 39392, 19
(Colom.).
149. See id. at 5 (concluding that the prosecution had incorrectly charged the
crimes as war crimes rather than as ordinary crimes, and basing its decision on the
fact that the victim and her family were not directly engaged in the hostilities at the
time of the crimes, reasoning that they were therefore not protected persons).
150. See id. at 56-57 (finding that their membership in the paramilitary group
had allowed the perpetrators to commit the crimes, as the paramilitary group
exercised control over the region where the crimes were perpetrated and over the
civilian population, including the women).
151. See id. at 55-56. Due to the conflict, the perpetrators were in a position of
power over the victim; this factor was decisive in their ability to carry out the
crimes.
152. See id. at 59. The accused perpetrated the acts of sexual violence on the
victim after murdering members of her family. Given the coercive circumstances
surrounding the sexual violence, the victim was unable to consent to these acts.
153. See id. at 56-57. The perpetrators acted pursuant to an order of a superior
to intimidate the family of the victim. The accused took advantage of this situation
to kidnap, torture and rape the victim.
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and show that charged incidents of sexual violence are connected to
the broader context of violence. Documenting patterns of violence
has assisted prosecutors in identifying: the contexts in which the
violence is committed; the manner in which the crimes were
perpetrated; the connections between sexual violence and other
human rights violations; the categories of victims; and the
perpetrator groups. 154
With regard to certain acts of sexual violence as war crimes, 155
prosecutors are required to prove the violent nature of the act in order
to show that the victim was incapable of genuinely consenting.
Recent reforms have recognized that the violent nature of the sexual
act can be established by the surrounding coercive circumstances.
Specifically, Law 1719 defines the notion of “violence” in similar
terms to the ICC’s definition of coercion in the context of rape. 156
Applying international standards, Law 1719 also states that consent
cannot be inferred by reason of any words or conduct of a
victim−where this consent is not voluntary and free−nor by reason of
the silence or lack of resistance by a victim. 157 In the case of children
154. See 2016 Sexual Violence Protocol, supra note 67, ¶¶ 57, 59-60
(highlighting the importance of contextualizing sexual violence to accurately
characterize the crimes and to link the crimes to senior accused, and
recommending that prosecutors move away from conducting single-incident
investigations and focus on documenting patterns of violence); see also Vanoy
Murillo Judgment, supra note 69, at 1262-64 (finding that the patterns of violence
in the case demonstrate the contextual elements for war crimes and crimes against
humanity).
155. See C. PEN. 2000, arts. 138-41 (defining different war crime categories of
sexual violence which require proof of violence: rape (art. 138), sexual slavery
(art. 141A), forced sterilization (art. 139B), forced nudity (art. 139D), and forced
abortion (art. 139E)).
156. L. 1719, art. 11 (defining “violence” as: “the use of force; threat of force;
physical or psychological coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence; duress;
illegal detention; psychological oppression; abuse of power; taking advantage of a
coercive environment or similar circumstances that prevent that the victim gives
genuine consent:”); see Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International
Criminal Court rs. 70-72, 2005, ICC-PIDS-LT-02-002/13_Eng [hereinafter ICC
Rules of Procedure and Evidence] (stating that consent cannot be inferred through
coercion); see also 2016 Sexual Violence Protocol, supra note 67, ¶ 231.
157. See L. 1719, art. 18; see also Corte Constitutional [C.C.] [Constitutional
Court], mayo 2, 2015, Sentencia T-453/05, M.P.: M. J. Cepeda Espinosa, ¶ 6.3,
Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C] (Colom.) [hereinafter Orejana Troya
Judgment] (holding that consent cannot be inferred from the prior sexual conduct
of the victim).
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under the age of 14, the law contains war crime provisions of
statutory rape and of sexual acts on minors under the age of 14, as it
is assumed that a child cannot consent to sexual conduct. 158 This
reinforced protection is important in the Colombian context, as
children have been particularly vulnerable to sexual violence by
armed actors. 159
As in the case of Peru, the application of the principle of legality
has been an issue in dealing with past violations in Colombia. The
2000 Criminal Code entered into force in July 2001 and, strictly
speaking, cannot be applied to crimes committed before that period.
However, in some cases dealing with crimes of non-sexual nature,
such as killings of civilians, courts have adopted a flexible
interpretation of the principle of legality. 160 They have held that
criminal conduct can be characterized as an international crime−for
example as murder on protected person−provided that the violation
in question constitutes an infringement of a rule of international
158. See C. PEN. 2000, arts. 138-39 (defining crimes of rape on protected
person under 14 years of age (art. 138A) and sexual acts on protected person under
14 years of age (art.139A)); see also Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme
Court], Sala de Casación Penal, septiembre 26, 2000, M.P: F. Ripoll, Proceso No.
13466, 3-5, (Colom.) (holding that non-consent is inferred in cases of sexual
violence against minors); see also 2016 Sexual Violence Protocol, supra note 67, ¶
234 (providing a more detailed analysis).
159. See Auto 009, ¶¶ 3-3.2.2 But see C. PEN. 2000, art. 162. With regard to
sexual violence against child soldiers, it should be noted that the Criminal Code
contains a prohibition on the recruitment by armed groups of children under the
age of 18 (art.162). However, the statutory rape provision only applies to those
under the age of 14.
160. This rule must be contained within a treaty ratified by Colombia in force at
the time of the crimes. However, the sentence applied to the crime must be that set
out in the criminal provisions in force at the time of its commission. Corte
Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala de Casación Penal, mayo 15,
2010, Radicación No. 33118, at 25-30 (Colom.) [hereinafter Cesar Pérez García];
Arroyo Ojeda Judgment, supra note 76, at 331; Tribunal Superior de Bogotá
[Superior Tribunal of Bogotá], Sala de Justicia y Paz, 110016000253200680281,
Sentencia, December 2, 2010, ¶¶ 188, 198-202 [hereinafter Laverde Zapata
Judgment]; Vanoy Murillo Judgment, supra note 69, at 232; Tribunal Superior del
Distrito Judicial de Bogota [T. Sup.] [Superior Tribunal Court of the District of
Bogota], Sala de Justicia y Paz, agosto 1, 2014, Radicación 11-001-60-0022532008-83201, at 16 (Colom.) [hereinafter Pestaña Coronado Judgement]; Tribunal
Superior del Distrito Judicial de Bogota [T. Sup.] [Superior Tribunal Court of the
District of Bogota], Sala de Justicia y Paz, julio 30, 2012, Radicación
110016000253200682222, at 136-37, 165 (Colom.) [hereinafter Giraldo Paniagua
Judgment ].
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humanitarian law binding on Colombia. 161 This interpretation is
grounded on Articles 93 and 94 of the 1991 Colombian Constitution,
which establish the primacy of international human rights treaties
over the domestic legal order. Crimes can therefore be adjudicated as
international crimes even if they were not recognized as such in the
domestic law in force when the crimes were committed. There is at
least one precedent, the November 2014 Mancuso et al case
discussed below, where the accused were found guilty for the crimes
of rape and sexual slavery as war crimes although the crimes were
committed before this conduct was characterized as a war crime in
domestic law. 162
The application of the principle of legality can become an issue in
relation to the new war crimes provisions introduced by Law 1719,
as this law entered into force in June 2014 and does not provide for
its retroactive application. The retroactive application of these new
provisions will require a progressive interpretation of the prohibition
against sexual violence under international law applicable to
Colombia.
In relation to different categories of crimes, courts in other Latin
American countries have developed similar expansive interpretations
of the principle of legality. 163 They have recognized the importance
161. Id.
162. However, the tribunal did not provide reasons regarding the legal
characterization of these crimes as war crimes. See Mancuso Judgment, supra note
69, ¶¶ 2142-45, 2177-85, 2192-95, 2202-05, 2215-26, 2250-60, 8651-54, 8686-88;
see also Camila Alejandra Hoyos Pulido & Maria Adelaida Palacio Puerta,
APORTES DE LAS SENTENCIAS DE JUSTICIA Y PAZ A LOS DERECHOS DE LAS MUJERES
38-40, 73-76 (Corporación Humanas, 2015) (providing an analysis of this
decision).
163. See Tribunal Oral en lo Criminal Federal No. 1 de la Plata [Federal
Criminal Oral Tribunal No. 1 of La Plata], 19/9/2006, “Sentencia contra
Etchocolatz por crímenes contra la humanidad” (Arg.), at 206-209 (finding that
crimes in the case amount to crimes against humanity under international law,
which has primacy over domestic law); see also Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.]
[Supreme Court], diciembre 13, 2006, “Caso Molco,” Rol de la causa: 559-2004,
criminal, Estudios Constitucionales [E.S] p. 533, ¶ 16-17 (Chile) (stating that it is
sufficient for international crimes to be recognized under international customary
law at the time of their perpetration to entail criminal liability); Fujimori Judgment,
supra note 108, ¶¶ 711, 714, 717; see also Juez Penal 19° Turno [Criminal Court
19°], marzo 26, 2009, “Gavazzo Pereira, José Nino. Arab Fernandez, José Ricardo
– Un Delito de Privación de Libertad,” Ficha 98-247/2006, ¶ 8 (Uruguay)
[hereinafter Gavazzo Pereira Judgment] (finding that while domestic law does not
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of examining gross human rights abuses through the lens of
international law, 164 and have taken into account the jurisprudence of
international criminal tribunals in their assessment of crimes. 165

D. PROSECUTING SEXUAL VIOLENCE AS GENOCIDE IN GUATEMALA
Sexual violence has been prosecuted as genocide in Guatemala. As
noted above, 166 in 2013, the High Risk Tribunal “A” found former
president Ríos Montt guilty for the genocide of the Mayan Ixil
population in various communities in 1982-1983. Although the
Constitutional Court overturned this judgment a few days after it was
issued, and the future of the case is currently uncertain, it remains an
important precedent.

recognize the crimes of torture and enforced disappearance, the criminality and
punishability of these acts can be determined by international law).
164. For example, in Argentina, courts have recognized the importance of
examining grave human rights abuses from the perspective of crimes against
humanity because they violate fundamental values of humanity. In the Julio Simón
et al case, in declaring the unconstitutionality of the Final Stop and Due Obedience
Laws −which prevented prosecutions for human rights abuses during the military
regime, federal judge Cavallo held that: “the facts must be judged incorporating in
the legal analysis those rules that the international community has developed in
their respect, without which it would not be possible to assess the facts in their full
dimension” and that “analyzing the facts exclusively from the perspective of the
Criminal Code would mean ignoring or putting aside a legal toolkit developed by
the consensus of nations especially for cases of extreme gravity as the present case.
It would be a valid legal analysis, but, undoubtedly, partial or insufficient.”
(unofficial translation). See Juzgado Nacional en lo Criminal y Correccional
Federal 4 [Federal Criminal and Correctional Court No. 4], 6/3/2001, “Simon,
Julio, Del Cerro, Juan Antonio s/sustracción de menores de 10 años,” 19,
Biblioteca de los Derechos Humanos de la Universidad de Minnesota (Arg.).
165. See, e.g., Court Criminal Federal de Santiago del Estero [Federal Criminal
Court of Santiago del Estero], 03/05/2013, “Aliendro, Juana Agustine et al., re
enforced disappearances, breaking and entering, and unlawful imprisonment,”
Case No. 960/11, 11-12, 137-38, 199, 224 (Arg.) (examining the recognition of
sexual violence crimes as crimes against humanity in ICTY jurisprudence); see
Corte Federal de Tucumán [Federal Court of Tucuman], Judgment, 19/05/2011,
“Fernández Juárez, María Lilia y Herrera, and Gustavo Enrique, re: unlawful
imprisonment” (Villa Urquiza Prison), 43 (Arg.) (analyzing the elements of the
crime of rape in ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence) (Argentina); see also Cámara
Federal de Casación Penal [Federal Court of Criminal Appeals], 17/02/2012, “Case
against Molina, Gregorio,” Case No. 12821, 66–69, 74 (Arg.) (discussing the
chapeau requirements of crimes against humanity articulated in ICTY
jurisprudence) (Argentina).
166. See discussion infra Section II (D).
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Relying on Article 376 of the Guatemalan Criminal Code, which
defines the crime of genocide, the prosecution put forward charges of
sexual violence as genocide by linking these crimes to a range of
other violent acts carried out by Guatemalan military forces against
the Mayan Ixil community. 167 It argued that sexual violence had been
one of the destructive means, together with other forms of violence,
used by the military to inflict serious bodily and mental harm on this
community. 168 It also argued that, in the same manner as the other
violent acts, the infliction of sexual violence had a destructive impact
on the community and was carried out with the intent to destroy the
community. 169
In its judgment, the tribunal found that the genocidal acts
perpetrated by government forces took various forms, including
killings, enforced disappearances, sexual violence against women
and girls, torture, cruel and inhumane treatment, destruction of crops
to induce starvation, and razing of civilian villages. 170 The objective
of this campaign was to eliminate the Mayan Ixil population,
considered by the government to be the support base of the guerrilla
and the internal enemy of the state. 171 When assessing whether sexual
violence formed part of the genocidal campaign, the tribunal
reasoned that the crimes were carried out for a destructive purpose
and targeted not only individual victims, but also the community:
government forces systematically targeted Mayan Ixil women
through rape and sexual slavery because they intended to destroy the

167. See Human Rights Prosecution Office, Unit of Special Cases related to the
Conflict, Indictment, Exp. MP001/2010/23251, C-01076-2011-00015, 27 March
2012 [hereinafter “Ríos Montt Indictment”], Sections II.A (underlying acts of
genocide) & IV (legal characterization and forms of responsibility) (relying on the
jurisprudence of the international ad hoc tribunals, the prosecution also charged
sexual violence as a form of torture under Article 378); see also Ríos Montt
Indictment, A.2.2 (crimes of sexual violence and torture against women).
168. Ríos Montt Indictment, Section II.A.2 (infliction of serious bodily and
mental harm on the members of the ethnic Mayan Ixil group); Ríos Montt
Judgment, supra note 27, at 9-11, 49-50, 68-71, 87-88.
169. Ríos Montt Indictment, supra note 168, at Section II.A.2.a (harm through
sexual violence); Ríos Montt Judgment, supra note 27, at 27-28, 34-35, 47, 71-73,
89-92.
170. Ríos Montt Judgment, supra note 27, at 108, 111, 113-14, 130, 137, 138,
140, 141-43, 683-84, 688-89, 699.
171. Id., at 103, 107-09.

KRAVETZ- FINAL PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

750

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

2/23/2017 12:40 PM

[32:3

fabric of the community. 172 The tribunal acknowledged the
intergenerational effect of sexual violence, as the women had the
important role of passing on life, culture and traditions within the
community. 173 By targeting the women, these forces sought to
destroy the entire community. 174 In relation to Ríos Montt’s role in
this campaign, the tribunal found that, as the then de facto president,
he was directly involved in designing and implementing a series of
military operations which provided the framework for the
counterinsurgency campaign that led to the genocide. 175 He had also
failed to prevent or punish the crimes. The tribunal found that he had
the required knowledge 176 and intent 177 to be held accountable for the
crimes. Finally, the tribunal affirmed that acknowledging the truth
about these crimes strengthened the rule of law and contributed to
their non-repetition. 178
This judgment represents an important recognition of the role and
purpose of sexual violence in the Guatemalan conflict. It also laid the
groundwork for future prosecutions by providing a broader
understanding of the conflict that includes the experiences of women.

172. Id., at 131-34, 141-42, 689-90 (finding that the rapes and mutilations
caused terror and physical and cultural destruction with the objective of
eliminating the Maya Ixil ethnic group and noting that the military and operational
plans indicated that the troops should have sexual access to Mayan women as “war
booty”).
173. Id., at 132-34, 142, 689-91 (finding that the killing of fetuses by soldiers
supported its finding of intent to commit genocide, as unborn children were
considered “a seed that must be destroyed”).
174. Id., at 141-42, 690-91.
175. Under Ríos Montt’s command, the Guatemalan army designed and carried
out a series of military operations, including code-named Victoria 82, Firmeza 83,
Sofia and Operation Ixil. Ríos Montt also authorized and implemented military and
operational plans, and ordered the development of the National Plan for Security
and Development (Plan Nacional de Seguridad y Desarrollo) and the Fundamental
Statute of the State (Estatuto Fundamental de Gobierno). Id. at 104, 107-10, 694706.
176. Ríos Montt Judgment, supra note 27, at 105-7, 110, 694-95, 699-703
(relying on military expert witnesses, among other sources, to find that, as the de
facto head of state, Ríos Montt knew or should have known about the crimes.
177. Id., at 111-12, 697, 699-700.
178. Id., at 707.
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E. ESTABLISHING LIABILITY FOR CONFLICT-RELATED SEXUAL
VIOLENCE

In the case study countries, conflict-related prosecutions have
primarily targeted physical perpetrators and low-level accused.
However, in recent years, there has been a greater focus on
prosecuting senior-level leaders who were not direct perpetrators, but
who led, devised policies, ordered, or tolerated crimes. 179 The cases
against senior leadership have forced legal practitioners to confront
the common misconception that only physical perpetrators can be
held accountable for sexual violence. 180 These cases have also
underscored the importance of pursuing the criminal liability of a
broad range of individuals whose responsibility can be established,
instead of focusing exclusively on the physical perpetrators.
When sexual violence is perpetrated in the context of gross human
rights abuses and conflict, a challenge practitioners face is to obtain
evidence on the identification of physical perpetrators. This can
prove difficult because the victims and witnesses may not know the
identity of those who committed the crimes. The traumatic nature of
the events, the passage of time and the specific circumstances
surrounding the crimes can also impact a victim’s ability to identify
the perpetrators. For these reasons, requiring a victim to provide
precise information on the identity of the physical perpetrators before
acting on a complaint, as well as failing to take into account the
liability of other persons involved in the crimes, can result in a denial

179. In 2012, the Colombian Attorney General’s Office adopted a directive for
the prioritization of conflict-related crimes. Among other things, it instructs
prosecutors to focus on those bearing the greatest responsibility for serious
violations of international humanitarian law. When interpreting the legality of this
directive, the Constitutional Court examined the term “those bearing the greatest
responsibility” in light of the practice of international and hybrid tribunals, and
held that while the Attorney General’s directive focuses on prosecuting those in
leadership positions, it does not imply that those who are not at that level do not
bear any responsibility and cannot be pursued. See Directiva 001, Fiscalía General
de la Nación [Attorney General’s Office], 10/04/2012, (Colom.); see also Corte
Constitucional [Constitutional Court], Aug. 28, 2012, Sentencia C-579/13, ¶ 8.2.3,
(Colom.).
180. 2016 Sexual Violence Protocol, supra note 67, ¶ 242 (recognizing that this
misconception among prosecutors and investigators−that only direct perpetrators
can be pursued for crimes of sexual violence−has significantly impeded
accountability for these crimes).
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of justice. 181
The Peruvian case of MMB illustrates this point. 182 In October
1992, members of the First Division of Military Special Forces
kidnapped MMB, then a 19-year-old student. 183 They accused her of
belonging to the Shining Path, beating and repeatedly raping her. 184
To get her to confess to certain activities, her captors threatened her
and her family. She eventually confessed and was sentenced to 15
years for terrorism. 185 As a result of the rapes, she became pregnant
and gave birth to a child in prison. 186
MMB consistently maintained that members of the Peruvian army
had subjected her to physical and psychological torture, including
rape, in detention. 187 After making this complaint to the director of
Chorrillos Prison, where she held on charges of terrorism, her case
was referred to the Public Prosecutor for investigation. 188 The Public
Prosecutor found that the crime of rape had been established, noting
that it was corroborated by a contemporaneous medical report. 189
However, the prosecutor later shelved the case because “it was not
possible to fully identify the suspects of this crime [. . .] one of the
elements of procedural due process, namely, the individualization of
the author or authors of the crime committed, is lacking. . .” 190
Military authorities later also investigated MMB’s allegations, but
dismissed the case due to lack of forensic evidence regarding the
181. See, e.g., Diana Guarnizo Peralta, Fourth Follow-Up Report to Auto 092 of
the Colombian Constitutional Court (2011) 38 (noting that in 2012, the Colombian
Inspector General’s Office reported that complaints of sexual violence victims
were often refused due to lack of information on the identity of the perpetrator).
182. In criminal cases in Peru, victims of sexual violence are referred to by a
pseudonym in order to protect their identity from the public. See Julieta Lemaitre,
Violence, in 24 GENDER AND SEXUALITY IN LATIN AMERICA – CASES AND
DECISIONS 192-94 (Cristina Motta & Marcarena Saez eds., 2013) (providing a
summary of the procedural background to the case).
183. BOESTEN, supra note 4, at 112.
184. CVR Final Report, supra note 11, Vol. VI, Ch. 1.5, 321.
185. See, e.g., id. at 379; see BOESTEN, supra note 4, at 112.
186. CVR Final Report, supra note 11, Vol. VI, Ch. 1.5, 382.
187. LEMAITRE, supra note 182, at 193.
188. Id. at 380.
189. LEMAITRE, supra note 182, at 193 (quoting the medical report, which
confirmed that “the prisoner filing the complaint is pregnant and, that as a result of
these acts, has conceived a child[.]”).
190. LEMAITRE, supra note 182, at 193-94; see also CVR Final Report, supra
note 11, Vol. VI, Ch. 1.5, 380.
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alleged rapes. 191 She was eventually cleared of all terrorism charges
and released. 192 When the CVR investigated this case, it found that
MMB had been illegally detained and subjected to torture while in
detention, and it called for a full investigation into these events by
the competent judicial authorities. 193
More than twenty years later, MMB is still seeking justice for
these crimes. After numerous delays, 194 the Public Prosecution
opened an investigation into these crimes and eventually charged
several senior members of the Peruvian military with the crimes of
aggravated abduction and torture as crimes against humanity. 195 In
2014, the trial against these accused began before a criminal tribunal
in Lima. 196 The case is now in its final phase and is focused on
establishing the responsibility not only of the physical perpetrators
but also of those running the detention center where MMB was
illegally detained and tortured. 197
In the case study countries, legal practitioners use different legal
191. CVR Final Report, supra note 11, Vol. VI, Ch. 1.5, 380-81. Since the
Military Justice Code in force at the time did not include the crime of rape, the
military tribunal initiated an investigation for abuse of authority by military
personnel. See LEMAITRE, supra note 182, at 193-94 (quoting the Examining
Judge’s decision “that there is no proven criminal responsibility of military
personnel of the Special Forces Division,” and basing his decision on the fact that
a forensic report of the victim did not reveal any physical signs of the alleged
rapes).
192. See, e.g., CVR Final Report, supra note 11, Vol. VI, Ch. 1.5, 383; see
Rosario Aronés C., Abren Juicio a diez militares por ultrajar a una mujer en
calabozo,
EL
POPULAR
(June
13,
2014,
5:00
AM),
http://www.elpopular.pe/actualidad-y-policiales/2014-06-13-abren-juicio-diezmilitares-por-ultrajar-una-mujer-en-calabozo.
193. CVR Final Report, supra note 11, Vol. VI, Ch. 1.5, 383-84.
194. E.g., BOESTEN, supra note 4, at 112-13 (explaining the delays in the
investigation of the case and the challenges faced by MMB in seeking justice); see
Defensoría del Pueblo, El Estado frente a las víctimas de la violencia. Hacia dónde
vamos en políticas de repación y justicia?, Informe Defensorial, N. 128, 160-61
(2007); see also Salazar Luzula, supra note 45, 64-67 (discussing the general
obstacles this case, as well as those in other similar cases of sexual violence).
195. Among other things, the accused have argued that these charges should be
dismissed because in 1992, crimes against humanity were not included in the
criminal code.
196. Aronés C., supra note 192; see Caso de María Magdalena Monteza
Benavides, INSTITUTO DE DEMOCRACIA Y DERECHOSE HUMANOS (1992),
http://idehpucp.pucp.edu.pe/comunicaciones/notas-informativas/caso-de-mariamagdalena-monteza-benavides-1992 (summarizing the case).
197. Aronés C., supra note 193.
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frameworks to reflect the liability of senior leadership in sexual
violence cases. In Colombia, co-perpetration and indirect
perpetration are two modes of liability used in cases against senior
leadership. 198 Co-perpetration requires proving that a plurality of
persons pursue a common criminal plan, and significantly contribute
to this plan while sharing the intent for the crimes to be committed. 199
The accused are not required to have physically committed the act of
sexual violence to be held liable as co-perpetrators, but need to have
significantly contributed to its commission. 200 Indirect perpetration
refers to the commission of a crime through another person 201 and
focuses on establishing the liability of “the perpetrator behind the
perpetrator”. 202 As in other Latin American countries, 203 in recent
years, Colombian prosecutors have used indirect perpetration
through organized structures of power to link crimes of subordinates
to senior leaders. The underlying rationale of this mode of liability as
198. See, e.g., 2016 Sexual Violence Protocol, supra note 67, ¶243; see 599 C.
PEN. Título II, art. 29 (2000).
199. 2016 Sexual Violence Protocol, supra note 67, ¶243(b).
200. Id.
201. See C. PEN., art. 29.
202. In Colombia, this mode of liability has been developed on the basis of the
legal doctrine originally developed by German jurist Claus Roxin. To establish
liability on the basis of indirect perpetration requires showing the existence of a
criminal organization, the control and authority exercised by accused over the
criminal organization, the subordinates’ compliance with the orders of the accused,
and the fungibility of the direct perpetrators. It also requires showing that the
accused intended the commission of the crimes. The leader must use his/her
control over the criminal organization to execute crimes, and must mobilize his/her
authority and power within the organization to ensure the commission of these
crimes. See, e.g., Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala de
Casación Penal, febrero 23, 2010, No. 32805, 77-78 [hereinafter Garcia Romero
Judgment]; see Tribunal Superior de Bogotá [Superior Tribunal of Bogotá], Sala
de Justicia y Paz, Rad. 11-001-60-00 253-2006 810099, Hébert Veloza García,
Oct. 30, 2013, ¶ 847-48, 859; see also Villa Zapata Judgment, supra note 60, ¶¶
303-04; see also generally Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on
confirmation
of
charges,
¶
495-518
(Sep.
30,
2008),
http://www.worldcourts.com/icc/eng/decisions/2008.03.10_Prosecutor_v_
Katanga2.pdf (applying the indirect perpetration method at the ICC); see also
HÉCTOR OLÁSOLO ALONSO, TRATADO DE AUTORÍA Y PARTICIPACIÓN EN DERECHO
PENAL INTERNACIONAL 300 (2013).
203. See, e.g., Tribunal Oral en lo Criminal Federal No. 1 de la Plata [Federal
Criminal Oral Tribunal No. 1 of La Plata], ‘Camps Circuit’ and others (Miguel
Osvaldo Etchecolatz), Case No. 2251/06, septiembre 19, 2006, 200-03
(Argentina); see Gavazzo Pereira Judgment, supra note 163, ¶ 6; see also Fujimori
Judgment, supra note 108, ¶¶ 723-48.
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applied in Colombian jurisprudence is that the perpetrator behind the
direct perpetrator is responsible because he/she controls the
organization that carries out the crimes and uses his/her authority and
power over this organization to secure the commission of the crimes.
The leadership of the criminal organization is therefore liable as the
principal, rather than as an accessory.
Several cases prosecuted under the transitional justice system have
applied indirect perpetration to connect senior-level accused to
crimes of sexual violence by subordinates. 204 For example, in both
the Villa Zapata et al and Mancuso et al cases, the Superior Tribunal
of Bogotá applied indirect perpetration through organized structures
of powers to hold paramilitary leaders accountable for sexual
violence by subordinates for making use of the organization they
controlled to commit the crimes. 205 The Villa Zapata et al case
concerns crimes perpetrated by the Bloque Vencedores de Arauca of
the AUC in the Arauca region, in northern Colombia. Among other
criminal acts, this armed group perpetrated different forms of sexual
and gender-based violence against women and girls, both within their
ranks and against civilians. 206 The accused were eight members of
this armed group. Orlando Villa Zapata, one of the commanders of
this group, was found guilty as an indirect perpetrator for crimes
committed by his subordinates. The tribunal found that in his
leadership role, he issued orders and designed, promoted and
implemented policies of violence and terror against civilians that led
to the crimes, including the sexual violence. 207 The Mancuso et al
204. See, e.g., Villa Zapata Judgment, supra note 60; Mancuso Judgment, supra
note 69; Triana Mahecha Judgment, supra note 67; Fierro Flores Judgment, supra
note 76.
205. As noted above, convictions in the transitional justice system are based on
admissions of guilt by the accused.
206. See Villa Zapata Judgment, supra note 60, ¶¶ 784-93, 881-904, 907-08,
913, 918-20, 922, 924-28, 930-39 (containing an extensive analysis of genderbased violence in conflict); see also Villa Zapata Judgment, supra note 60, at ¶¶
583-635, 758-61 (examining the crimes of femicide and enforced disappearance
based on gender); see also Villa Zapata Judgment, supra note 60, ¶¶ 680-717, 78289 (examining the treatment of sexual and gender-based violence in international
humanitarian, human rights and criminal law); see generally Villa Zapata
Judgment, supra note 60, ¶¶ 566-82 (referring to the different forms of sexual and
gender-based violence in conflict).
207. Villa Zapata Judgment, supra note 60, ¶¶ 414-18, 423-24 (referring to the
elements of indirect perpetration under Colombian jurisprudence); Villa Zapata
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case concerned twelve senior members of the AUC charged with
crimes perpetrated by this paramilitary group in eight regions of
Colombia. These crimes included 175 incidents of sexual and
gender-based violence against both female and male victims. 208 The
tribunal found that the AUC used different criminal means to gain
territorial control and strategic advantages, and to impose their rule
upon the local population. 209 In particular, they used sexual and
gender-based violence to sow terror, inflict revenge on adversaries,
exploit victims, and destroy the social fabric of communities. 210
Salvatore Mancuso, one of the top leaders of the AUC, 211 was found
guilty for these crimes because, in his leadership role, he issued and
implemented policies that resulted in these crimes. 212
In Peru, prosecutors have also relied on indirect perpetration as a
mode of liability to hold senior-level leaders accountable for crimes
of subordinates. 213 In the Chumbivilcas, Los Cabitos and Manta and
Judgment, supra note 60, ¶¶ 440-67, 879, 886, 911, 923, 933, 942 (examining
Villa Zapata’s responsibility as an indirect perpetrator based on his leadership role
in the paramilitary group and his role in issuing orders to further the criminal goals
of this armed group); Villa Zapata Judgment, supra note 60, ¶¶ 459-61 (finding
that Villa Zapata had knowledge that some of his subordinates were perpetrating
sexual violence as these crimes were of common knowledge); see OLÁSOLO
ALONSO, supra note 202, at 288 (indicating that in Colombian jurisprudence, to
incur liability as an indirect perpetrator in the context of a campaign of mass
atrocities, it is not required to show that the senior-level leader issued precise
orders to his/her subordinates to commit the crimes; it is sufficient to show that
he/she provided general instructions or guidelines regarding the implementation of
this campaign, for example by identifying the targeted population of this violence).
208. See Mancuso Judgment, supra note 69, ¶¶ 112, 1306, 2147-2958
(including the crimes of rape, sexual slavery, torture and forced abortion).
209. Id. ¶¶ 412, 574.
210. Id. ¶¶ 412, 1290-1306.
211. Id., 121, 125, 133. In 2008, Mancuso and other paramilitary leaders were
extradited to the US to face drug trafficking charges. He is currently serving a 15year sentence at a US prison. He has participated in transitional justice proceedings
in Colombia via video link.
212. Id. ¶¶ 1450-51, 8587-91, 8593, 8652 (adding that he failed to exercise
control over his subordinates to prevent the crimes, but failing to explain why he
was held liable as an indirect perpetrator for his failure to act); Fierro Flores
Judgment, supra note 76, ¶ 647 (convicting the accused, a paramilitary
commander, as an indirect perpetrator for the crime of rape for failing to exercise
control over one of his subordinates to prevent crimes, and finding that, rather than
disciplining the perpetrator, Fierro Flores kept him within the ranks of his armed
group despite his criminal propensity and drug consumption).
213. See, e.g., Fujimori Judgment, supra note 108, ¶¶ 723-48 (discussing the
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Vilca cases mentioned above, prosecutors have brought charges
against senior military leaders on the basis of indirect perpetration. 214
For example, in the revised indictment in the Chumbivilcas case, one
of the accused, Jaime Pando Navarrete, former commander of the
military base in Antabamba, was charged as an indirect perpetrator
through organized structures of power for the crimes of enforced
disappearance, serious bodily harm resulting in death, sexual
violence and murder. He exercised his authority over the military
personnel at this base and, in this position of authority, he planned,
organized, issued directives and implemented counterinsurgency
programs that led to the commission of the crimes by his
subordinates. 215 As noted above, these trials have not yet been
completed.
There has been a tendency among Peruvian prosecutors to apply
indirect perpetration in cases involving persons in positions of
leadership without adequately establishing the required connections
between the crimes and the accused (for example without
establishing the link between the physical perpetrators and the senior
leader). Also, in some cases, courts have applied more stringent
standards, for instance by requiring evidence of orders by the
accused to the perpetrators to commit crimes. 216 Clear evidentiary
and legal strategies are needed to ensure that the evidence adduced
against senior leaders is capable of satisfying the mode of liability
charged.
In both Peru and Colombia, accused persons can be held liable for
application of the indirect perpetration as a mode of liability in Peru); see C. PEN.
art. 23 [Peru] (addresses indirect perpetration in the following language: “Any
person who carries out the punishable act, by himself or through another, and those
who commit it jointly. . .”); see also Aimee Sullivan, The Judgment Against
Fujimori for Human Rights Violations, 25 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 4, 678-80 (2010)
(explaining the findings in the Fujimori case regarding his liability as an indirect
perpetrator).
214. These cases also include charges of commission against the physical
perpetrators of the crimes.
215. Fiscalía Superior Nacional [National Prosecution Office], Exp. No. 0372008, Resolución de ampliación de acusación, 2 septiembre 2013, 6-13.
216. See, e.g., Sala Penal Nacional [National Criminal Chamber], Adrián
Roman Fernandez y César Eduardo Espejo Lopez, Exp. No. 40-2013-0-5001-SPPE-01, Sentencia, enero 19, 2016 (acquitting two military officers of the charges of
aggravated murder and enforced disappearance as indirect perpetrators due to the
absence of evidence of orders to commit the crimes).
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their omissions if their active involvement in the crimes cannot be
proved. 217 This liability is grounded on the duty of political and
military leaders to act to protect an endangered legal interest (for
example to protect the civilian population), their ability to act, and
their failure to do so. The criminal codes in these countries do not
recognize command responsibility, which is a specific form of
omission liability and, under international customary law, can be
applied where a superior failed to prevent or punish crimes
committed by subordinates. 218 More progressive approaches to
interpreting omission liability are required so that the full extent of
the responsibility of senior leaders is reflected in the cases under
investigation.
Finally, in Guatemala, the criminal code recognizes two broad
categories of liability: commission and accomplice liability. 219
Article 36 sets out the different forms of commission. Command
responsibility−as defined in international law−is not explicitly
incorporated in the Guatemalan Criminal Code.
In the Sepur Zarco case, both accused were found guilty for
commission under Article 36, for their acts and omissions. In relation
217. See, e.g., Corte Suprema de Justicia [Supreme Court of Justice],
Corregimiento La Gabarra, Recurso de Casación, Radicación 24448, MP. A. J.
Ibáñez Guzmán, septiembre 12, 2007, Section II (Colom.) (finding the accused had
the duty to protect the civilian population of La Gabarra but failed to prevent the
paramilitary attack on this locality despite having the ability to do so); see Corte
Constitucional [Constitutional Court], Sentencia SU-1184 de 2001, M.P. E.
Montealegre Lynett, noviembre 13, 2001, ¶¶ 17-18 (finding that under the
Constitution, the armed forces have the legal duty to act to prevent violations of
human rights and international humanitarian law).
218. When examining the legality of the legislation implementing the Rome
Statute, the Constitutional Court examined the domestic applicability of command
responsibility as set out in Article 28 of the Rome Statute in Colombia. It held that
Colombian jurisprudence recognizes that military commanders have the duty to act
to prevent serious international crimes and that they can incur criminal liability for
failing to act. It therefore found that domestic jurisprudence has established that
military commanders can be held liable for their omissions, and that Article 28 is
not incompatible with this jurisprudence. Corte Constitucional [Constitutional
Court], Revisión constitucional del Estatuto de Roma de la Corte Penal
Internacional – Revisión de la Ley 742 del 5 de junio de 2002 “Por medio de la
cual se aprueba el Estatuto de Roma de la Corte Penal Internacional, hecho en
Roma el día diecisiete (17) de julio de mil novecientos noventa y ocho (1998)”,
Sentencia C-578/02, Expediente LAT-223, M.P.: E. Cifuentes Muñoz, julio 30,
2002, Section 6.2.
219. Guatemalan Crim. Code (Decree 17/73), art. 35.
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to one of the accused, Reyes Girón, the tribunal found that, as the
then commander of the Sepur Zarco military base, he was in charge
of the base and of the soldiers responsible for the crimes, had
extensive knowledge of the crimes, and took no action to prevent
them. 220 In this role, he had the duty to protect the civilian
population, but instead chose to allow their rights to be grossly
violated. Reyes Girón could have ordered the soldiers to respect the
women in the community and could have prevented the rapes and
sexual slavery, but failed to do so.221 The tribunal reasoned that by
failing to act and by supporting the criminal conduct of his
subordinates, Reyes Girón was liable for commission.222 The
tribunal rejected the defence’s claims that the crimes were outside
the control and powers of the accused. 223 The tribunal followed
similar reasoning with respect to Valdez Asig, the former military
commissioner in the area. 224
The above-mentioned cases against high-level leaders provide
insights into the role sexual violence played in the mass atrocity
campaigns unleashed by armed actors in the different conflicts. They
also show how the failure of senior leadership to respond to these
crimes encourages further criminality and entrenches a culture of
impunity.

IV. CONCLUSION
The prosecution efforts and successful outcomes in sexual
violence cases in the case study countries set influential precedents to
promote accountability at the domestic level, providing key lessons
to practitioners in other national systems. To accurately convey the
purpose and characteristics of sexual violence in the respective
conflicts, practitioners are applying the international law framework
domestically. In Colombia, practitioners are using international law
to interpret criminal provisions, to charge different forms of sexual
violence, and to reflect the connections between sexual violence and
220. Sepur Zarco Judgment, supra note 36, 490-93.
221. Id. 492-93.
222. Id. (finding both accused guilty under Article 36 ¶1 and ¶3 of the Criminal
Code for participating in the commission of the crimes and for significantly
contributing to their commission).
223. Id. 491-92.
224. Id. 491-93.
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the broader context of violence. In Peru, practitioners are applying
international law to capture the gravity and role of this violence in
the charges and to navigate the statute of limitations. In Guatemala,
practitioners are relying on international law to flesh out and apply
criminal provisions to include sexual violence, and to advocate that
sexual violence was an integral part of a genocidal campaign. These
examples show the importance of harmonizing domestic and
international rules to appropriately prosecute international crimes.
Practitioners are making progress in holding high-level leaders
accountable for sexual violence by subordinates. To do so, they have
had to develop appropriate investigative and legal strategies to
establish the link between the actions or inactions of accused and the
crimes. Depending on the mode of liability used, practitioners have
focused on obtaining evidence relevant to the accused’s position and
relationship with the perpetrators, the authority and powers of the
accused, the accused’s attitude towards and awareness of the crimes,
and the chains of command and reporting systems in place.
Establishing patterns of violence has served to identify the manner in
which the crimes were perpetrated, the categories of victims and the
perpetrator groups, as well the organized and coordinated nature of
this violence. This has in turn contributed to establishing the required
connections between the crimes and the high-level leaders. The cases
against senior officials discussed above have demonstrated the
strategic use of sexual violence in these conflicts.
Finally, the experiences of the case study countries show that
criminal trials remain a key demand of victims. Through their
perseverance and advocacy, victims have brought down the barriers
to the domestic remedies for human rights abuses in their respective
countries. However, while the prosecution of these abuses has been
an important component of transitional justice efforts, it has not been
the only component. Measures aimed at truth telling, and at repairing
or redressing the impact of the harm caused to the victims and their
communities have been equally relevant. As discussed above, in the
three countries, truth-telling and historical memory processes
preceded the prosecution of crimes. These processes surfaced the
gendered dimensions of the conflicts in each country, acknowledging
neglected abuses and providing a forum for victims to share their
experiences of conflict. These processes also strengthened the
determination of victims to take their cases to court, and influenced
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the priority given in the context of criminal trials to reparations and
redress for victims. For example, to preserve the memory of the
crimes and educate the public, the Sepur Zarco tribunal ordered,
among other measures, that educational textbooks and study
programs include references to the stories of the women of Sepur
Zarco, and that the local municipality build a monument in
recognition of their efforts to seek justice. 225 In Colombia, judgments
issued under the transitional justice system have similarly included
varied forms of redress for victims. 226 These different measures have
contributed to the creation of a historical record regarding past
abuses and to a public understanding of the crimes and their impact
in the affected communities. These measures also serve to promote
the non-repetition of violence.
National systems remain the principle venue for holding
individuals accountable for international crimes, including those
relating to sexual violence. 227 As in the case study countries, national
legal systems in other regions are playing an increasingly crucial role
in delivering accountability for international crimes and in bridging
the impunity gap where international courts cannot or will not

225. Id. 510-11.
226. See, e.g., Triana Mahecha Judgment, supra note 67, at 952-53 (ordering
the Unit for Assistance and Reparations for Victims (UARIV) to implement
different forms of reparations); see Triana Mahecha Judgment, supra note 67, at
954 (instructing the National Center for Historical Memory to document crimes
perpetrated in the region of Magdalena Medio during the conflict); see also Triana
Mahecha Judgment, supra note 67, at 957 (instructing the National Center for
Historical Memory and the UARIV to identify the LGBT population affected by
the conflict and to develop an integral reparation programs); see also Villa Zapata
Judgment, supra note 60, 1028 (ordering the creation of a museum to
commemorate the victims and prevent the repetition of crimes); see also Villa
Zapata Judgment, supra note 60, 1046 (recognizing the right of victims to financial
reparations); see also Villa Zapata Judgment, supra note 60, 1046-50 (ordering
different state institutions to provide psychosocial, educational and medical
support to the victims, as well as financial assistance to victim communities); see
also Mancuso Judgment, supra note 69, 2258 (instructing different government
agencies to implement an integral program to support female and male survivors of
sexual violence); see also Mancuso Judgment, supra note 69, 2259 (instructing the
national and regional offices of the Ministry of Education to implement
educational campaigns in the affected regions to give visibility to gender-based
violence in the conflict and its impact on victims).
227. U.N. Secretary-General, Sexual Violence in Conflict, ¶ 111, U.N. Doc.
A/67/792-S/2013/149 (March 14, 2013).
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reach. 228 By facing up to a violent past, these countries are slowly
establishing a culture of legal justice in the aftermath of mass
atrocities.

228. See Kim Thuy Seelinger, Domestic Accountability for Sexual Violence:
The Potential of Specialized Units in Kenya, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Uganda, 96
INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 534, 593-64 (2014) (highlighting the challenges in
addressing conflict-related sexual violence crimes at the domestic level and
proposing measures to overcome them). ), 96), 539–564, at 540.

